Jean-Paul Sartre — Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology

987 published claims from this book.

• ‘Being is what it is’ names only the in-itself, not all being.
• A crowd’s unity arises from the leader’s look that objectifies its members.
• A distant future that is not awaited ossifies into a thing-like given possibility.
• A for-itself can never constitute itself as evil on its own
• A fulfilled demand for love destroys the very condition the demand required.
• A fundamental choice is only real as a choice in the world
• A genuinely created being must tear itself free and assume its own being
• A look already captured by the Other cannot objectify what he already fixes
• A love’s arrested future is what makes it love rather than caprice
• A mood like sadness is a conduct one perpetually recreates, never an achieved state
• A more profound freedom than will underlies all volitional acts
• A nihilating being cannot be the cause of further phenomena
• A perpetual failed synthesis keeps the in-itself and for-itself inseparable yet independent
• A person can be defined by the structure of their relations to the dead
• A person’s varied past selves all exist in the mode of having been
• A place’s meaning is fixed only by the future ends toward which freedom projects.
• A possibility’s existential weight, not its temporal proximity, determines the present For-itself.
• A prisoner is always free to project escape, whatever his condition.
• A punctured tire can radically transform one’s whole situation and projects
• A quality’s being is radically distinct from the for-itself’s mode
• A radical conversion reinterprets the old project as a past it must supersede.
• A single nihilation of Being suffices to constitute the entire world.
• A social role can only be played at, never simply inhabited
• A third observer can disarm the Other’s gaze by transcending it in turn
• A unified human We-subject is impossible; conflict grounds being-for-others
• A value grounded in being would destroy value and enslave the will
• A viable theory of the Other must rest on internal negation, not on God.
• A will cannot act on a fully determined psychic process
• Abandonment means total responsibility, not helpless passivity
• Ablation and apparition are real only from the For-itself’s viewpoint
• Absence is a mode of being between human-realities, not between persons and places
• Absence is not given by objects but posited by a consciousness that negates
• Absolute change needs no underlying permanent substratum
• Absolute freedom makes one’s every choice perpetually fragile and invertible
• Absorbed in a task one experiences no instant, only perpetual self-pursuit.
• Abstract essence arrives from the future as the meaning of present negation
• Abstract qualities are future possibilities the For-itself has to be
• Abstract quality is apprehended in the future mode, correlative with negation
• Abstraction is constitutive of the this, not a separate act added to it
• Abstraction is the for-itself’s original mode of being, not a mental act
• All concrete desires reduce to having, doing, or being
• All determination is surpassing, and Dasein directs it toward itself
• All empirical knowledge of one’s own body derives from the Other and alienates it
• All human activities are equivalent and equally doomed to failure in pursuit of being
• All human desires reduce to a desire to be or a desire to have.
• All human projects aim at becoming God through self-causation
• All interpersonal conduct reduces to desire, love, and hate as fundamental projects
• All interpersonal relations rest on an unstable subject-object struggle.
• All knowledge reduces to intuition, which is consciousness’s presence to things
• All understanding is necessarily reductive abstraction
• An absorbed person appears as a closed Gestalt, a thinglike object for me.
• An act is a transcendent psychic synthesis the for-itself must live
• An act must be self-present as operative intention to unify consciousness
• An activity expresses my total being and original choice in that circumstance
• An end must be both accessible and separated from us by real existents
• An essence is radically severed from the single appearance that manifests it
• An existent is nothing but the totality of its appearances
• An object’s objectivity rests on a principle binding its infinite appearances
• An oppressed class becomes a We-subject only by objectifying its oppressors as Them.
• An order counts as an imperative only by combining free assumption with preserved exteriority
• An unrealized future persists as an ideal co-presence haunting the present.
• Anger is a meaningful act in situation, not a hidden inner event
• Anguish and responsibility are the felt consciousness of self-choice.
• Anguish arises because the self’s future identity is never guaranteed
• Anguish arises when consciousness sees itself cut from its essence by nothingness
• Anguish before freedom and anguish before nothingness describe the same phenomenon.
• Anguish can arise alone where success or worth is at stake rather than survival
• Anguish cannot be hidden because flight from it is itself a mode of consciousness
• Anguish is consciousness of being one’s own future in the mode of not-being
• Anguish is fear of oneself while fear targets beings in the world
• Anguish is freedom’s self-apprehension, opposed to the serious man’s faith in external values
• Anguish is rare despite freedom being a permanent human structure.
• Anguish reveals that man is separated by nothingness from his essence.
• Anguish reveals that one’s original choice is unjustifiable and contingent
• Anguish reveals the double nihilation that suspends the world in nothingness
• Another person’s perception of objects disintegrates the spatial relations I establish between things
• Any attempt at sincere self-knowledge covertly turns oneself into a thing
• Appearance is full positivity, exactly equal to the being of the existent
• Approaching an object dissolves its unified being into nothingness.
• Appropriation is the original project grounding the for-itself’s relation to the slimy
• Assume the Other’s freedom to become limited by their gaze
• At death a life becomes an in-itself whose meaning only others sustain.
• Attempting to appropriate the Other destroys the incarnational freedom desire sought
• Authenticity is the radical self-recovery that escapes the good-bad faith dichotomy
• Bad faith also positively constitutes the self as what it is not
• Bad faith and good faith are both flights conditioned by consciousness’s inner self-disintegration
• Bad faith collapses the deceiver and deceived into one consciousness
• Bad faith decides in advance to settle for uncertain truths
• Bad faith emerges when one acknowledges facts but refuses their imposed conclusion.
• Bad faith exploits belief’s inherent self-undoing to install impossible beliefs
• Bad faith exploits transcendence to evade reproach by affirming it as a thing.
• Bad faith flees anguish by relocating freedom into a fixed essence of the self
• Bad faith is a form of belief, not a lie or certainty
• Bad faith is the contradiction of asserting both freedom and its absence at once
• Bad faith neutralizes doubt by declaring non-persuasion universal
• Bad faith operates by restricting another’s conduct to the present and refusing temporal meaning
• Bad faith perpetuates itself like dreaming and resists waking
• Bad faith requires a being that is not what it is, unlike inert objects
• Bad faith requires a conscious effort that simultaneously recognizes and denies an experience.
• Bad faith requires a self-decentering power that nihilates anguish while being it
• Bad faith requires the for-itself to both be and not be what it is
• Bad faith takes past motives as fixed things immune to present meaning
• Bad faith unifies being and nothingness in a single consciousness
• Bad faith works by forming concepts that fuse facticity and transcendence without synthesizing them
• Bad faith’s possibility constrains what kind of being man must be.
• Becoming is possible only because being and its modes are heterogeneous
• Being a partial subject need not reduce one to a passive object
• Being and non-being relate only through an internal nihilating bond
• Being and non-being tempt us to treat them as equal complementary components
• Being conscious of one’s motives already places them outside the self
• Being conscious of one’s project does not entail knowing it
• Being is logically prior to nothingness, which has only borrowed existence.
• Being is necessarily defined against what it is not
• Being itself is neither active nor passive, since both require being first.
• Being loved transforms one’s facticity from contingent to justified
• Being nothing lets consciousness escape the Other who would ensnare it.
• Being objectified by another’s look constitutes an inescapable existential guilt
• Being one’s past is the foundation of being able not to be it
• Being past turns subjective states into thing-like objective facts
• Being present in a place does not let one realize being that place
• Being reflected upon gives consciousness a sense of having an outside
• Being seen alienates my flight into an object I cannot escape
• Being seen by the Other freezes my lived situation into a fixed in-itself form
• Being seen enslaves me to a freedom that is not my own
• Being seen is first felt as bodily vulnerability and non-escape
• Being watched strips my own gaze of its objectifying power over others
• Being-for-others alienates me into an objectivity I cannot reclaim for myself
• Being-for-others generates perpetual conflict as each self objectifies the other
• Being-for-others is the third ekstasis, after the nihilation and reflection
• Being-for-others precedes and founds the experience of the we.
• Being-for-others requires an internal negation, not an external or in-itself one.
• Being-in-itself can found its nothingness but never its being
• Being-in-itself is a solid, self-sealed mass without interiority.
• Being-in-itself is full positivity, excluding all negation, becoming, and temporality.
• Being-in-itself is radically contingent and cannot be derived from anything.
• Being-in-itself is radically contingent, deriving from nothing and reducible to no necessity.
• Being-in-itself is so full of itself it cannot reflect or affirm.
• Being-in-the-world means losing oneself in the instrumental chain of for-whats
• Being-seen produces essential modifications in the for-itself’s structure
• Being-seen-by-the-Other is the foundational relation from which the Other-as-object is derived
• Belief in good faith is a chosen, self-maintained decision rather than an intuition
• Belief in instantaneous sacramental love at the altar persists in ordinary piety
• Berkeley’s esse est percipi fails for reasons in both perceiving and perceived.
• Blushing reveals consciousness of one’s body as a thing for the Other
• Body knowledge becomes cognitive only through the gaze of the Other.
• Body-for-others is studied through the identity of my-being-for-the-Other structures
• Both Hegel and Heidegger fail to ground negation in a negative being
• Bourget’s account reduces the literary temperament to a few simple psychic elements
• Causality cannot serve as a bridge between two radically separated experiences
• Cause is the objective situation apprehended as a means toward a presupposed end
• Cause, motive, and end are indissoluble terms of a single free projection.
• Causes do not determine actions; causes emerge only through an already-constituted project toward ends.
• Causes require nihilation and transcendence toward a not-yet-existing potentiality
• Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference
• Character and temperament differ only by the project of interpretation, not by substance.
• Character is instinctual structure reshaped by social conditions into rationalized behavior.
• Character is not a fixed trait but a freely chosen project the self maintains.
• Choice and consciousness are identical rather than separate acts
• Choosing a situation and choosing one’s self are inseparable daily acts
• Choosing to be indifferent to the dead is still a choice of attitude
• Class consciousness arises from being looked at by oppressors, not from material hardship.
• Coenesthesia is the affective, non-thetic texture of consciousness that projects surpass
• Comparative analysis of conduct reveals a person’s fundamental choice hidden under each act
• Complicity is only a juridical notion that fails against freedom
• Conceiving consciousness as in-itself makes past and present unreconnectable
• Concepts about my body only signify, never deliver, its lived self-alienation
• Conflict, not harmony, is the original meaning of being-for-others
• Consciousness and its affect are one indivisible being, not substance plus quality
• Consciousness and its being form an inseparable dyad
• Consciousness can disclose a being that is mine yet not for-me
• Consciousness cannot be caused by any motivation external to itself
• Consciousness cannot constitute its object because that object is a full presence outside it
• Consciousness defines itself by internal negation of its own objects
• Consciousness freely chooses itself as not being the Other.
• Consciousness grounds itself and precedes all nothingness
• Consciousness has no content because it is always directed outward at objects
• Consciousness has no inertia; it must perpetually recreate its own states
• Consciousness introduces differentiation, meaning, and plurality into undifferentiated Being
• Consciousness is a being that is conscious of the nothingness of its own being.
• Consciousness is a duality that is unity, irreducible to the in-itself
• Consciousness is being, not merely self-knowledge, so knowledge’s primacy must be abandoned
• Consciousness is defined as a lack or desire for Being
• Consciousness is necessarily directed at a being other than itself
• Consciousness never coincides with itself because it exists for a witness
• Consciousness of self is identical with consciousness of the object, not a separate act
• Consciousness sustains its own being rather than being sustained by it.
• Consciousness transcends toward the meaning of being, not being itself
• Consciousness’s temporality refuses the instant because the for-itself never is.
• Consciousness’s translucency makes bad faith a metastable, evanescent structure
• Contemplating one’s death reveals oneself as the future prey of others.
• Crystallization and decrystallization shift the symbolic value of objects I perceive
• Death belongs to facticity, not to freedom, and transforms us into the outside.
• Death cannot be an authentic human possibility because it negates all projects
• Death converts the for-itself into an in-itself that only others can interpret
• Death enters experience only as an interiorized meaning out of reach.
• Death is the final victory of the in-itself over the for-itself
• Death removes all meaning from life because it suppresses the project that awaited judgment
• Deferring a decision is an enacted form of self-deception about freedom
• Descartes and Kant both assigned temporal unity to an extra-temporal being
• Desire aims at eternalizing itself rather than annihilating itself
• Desire has a double determination toward being and toward appropriating concrete objects
• Desire is a chosen mode of consciousness, not a passive impingement
• Desire is a distinctive mode of self-choice, not a mere directed longing
• Desire is a pre-deliberate project realized only through one’s own incarnation.
• Desire is consciousness directed outward at objects, not a psychic entity contained within
• Desire is consciousness troubled by its own inapprehensible facticity
• Desire is defined by its transcendent object, not by pursuit of pleasure
• Desire is doomed to failure because coitus and pleasure are not its essential goal
• Desire must be its own lack, not a merely physiological state
• Desire proves human reality is constituted as a lack
• Desire radically alters both the body’s lived being and the correlated world
• Desire seeks self-coincidence that structural impossibility guarantees vanishing upon fulfillment.
• Desire singles out undifferentiated, nearly motionless flesh as the image of pure facticity
• Desire strips the Other’s body of movement and garb to reveal pure flesh
• Desire strips the world of meaning to reduce self and Other to pure facticity.
• Desire to have and desire to be are inseparable routes to one goal
• Destruction appropriates objects more keenly than creation does.
• Determinism functions primarily as an excuse mechanism against anguish.
• Directed attention does not weaken world-consciousness but relegates the world to ground
• Distraction is consciousness fleeing anguish by disowning its own possibilities
• Doubt is a temporal project spanning past motivation and future resolution
• Each additional spectator multiplies the Other’s alienation and makes reappropriation impossible
• Each concrete desire expresses the whole of human reality.
• Each empirical tendency expresses the whole person, not merely a part
• Each For-itself exists its body in a unique way within invariant human structures.
• Each person’s situation is uniquely theirs, a gate built for one
• Each resolution must be freely re-created rather than persist as a force
• Each temporal dimension of the for-itself derives its meaning from another dimension
• Earlier eras cannot be judged as lacking technologies they did not know.
• Eating appropriates another being by destroying and assimilating it
• Einfühlung and sympathy theories fail to establish the Other’s existence, only its presentation
• Emotion fails because it denies the world’s resistance while reason succeeds by acknowledging it
• Emotional behaviors do not express inner states; they are the states
• Empirical freedom is a negative concept defined by absence of constraint within a situation.
• Empirical freedom is a secondary nihilation that presupposes an original nothingness
• Empirical psychoanalysis cannot explain why the subject recognizes the truth of its interpretations
• Engaged actions crystallize into relatively independent transcendent forms
• Environmental changes cannot cause us to abandon projects; we freely constitute the impossibility.
• Erroneous perception of a look could render shame a false shame before nobody.
• Essence is a reified nothingness that knowledge neither adds nor removes
• Essence is the manifest law of appearances, itself an appearance
• Establishing knowledge requires abandoning its primacy over being
• Eternal rest sought by humans is self-coincidence, not endless duration
• Even first-person knowledge of my own body is mediated by the Other’s concepts
• Even mental undressing of another requires literally incarnating oneself.
• Even prohibitions and coercion cannot limit freedom; only being-objectified by another can.
• Even self-directed sincerity converts freedom into a thing to escape it.
• Even the ontological question reduces being itself to another phenomenon
• Even the worst situations remain fundamentally human and thus our responsibility
• Even visual anomalies are objective relations between world-objects, not subjective modifications.
• Every act emanates from a fundamental choice of being God
• Every act expresses the totality of the self rather than prior causes
• Every act toward the Other, even consolation, forces and instrumentalizes their freedom
• Every attitude toward the Other fails and collapses into its opposite
• Every dyadic relation with an Other rests on a ground of all other consciousnesses
• Every free situation inevitably has an alienated face freedom never chose
• Every human act expresses the whole person, not a fragment
• Every human being fundamentally desires to be God, a desire that is inherently self-contradictory.
• Every human project aims to become God, a goal that proves impossible
• Every human project is grasped by referencing other possibles back to an ultimate possibility.
• Every human situation yields an Us experience once a Third appears
• Every possessive act secretly aims to become the foundation of the whole world
• Every quality symbolically expresses a being that escapes us entirely
• Every question admits in principle the possibility of negation
• Every sentence is a free act of self-choice, not an assembly of words.
• Everyday negations need no leap beyond the world toward abstract nothingness.
• Everyday use is a partial destruction that secretly pleases us.
• Evidence means the immediate in-person presence of psychic objects in reflection
• Existential psychoanalysis decodes behavior to reveal each person’s fundamental choice of being.
• Existential psychoanalysis rejects the unconscious and makes psychic acts coextensive with consciousness
• Explaining desires by genus classification assumes the abstract precedes the concrete
• Expressive conduct is understood directly, original to perception, not by analogy
• Exteriority-to-self can be revealed only to a being that is consciousness
• External negation leaves beings untouched while internal negation constitutes them.
• External negations leave beings untouched while internal negations constitute the self
• External objects resist the For-itself’s projects by a measurable degree
• Facticity and the past are identical in Sartre’s ontology
• Facticity is only ever graspable as already recovered and freely constructed
• Facticity makes the for-itself both wholly responsible and wholly unjustifiable.
• Facticity neither determines who we are nor resists us independently of consciousness
• Fascination exemplifies knowing as pure negation, not fusion with the object
• Fatigue becomes bearable or intolerable only through reflective consciousness conferring value
• Fear and anguish are the same situation judged from opposite directions of causality
• Fear and anguish cannot coexist because one is reflective and the other unreflective
• Fear apprehends the self as a passive destructible object among external causes
• Fear is magical conduct, not physiological disorder, that alters the instrumental world
• Feudalism is an abstract structure surpassed by individual projects, not the sum of relations.
• Finitude arises from choice excluding alternatives, not from mortality.
• Finitude is the condition of freedom, since freedom requires choice.
• Finitude is the necessary condition of the For-itself’s original project
• Flight from one’s situation is itself an assumption of that situation
• Food preferences express one’s fundamental existential project
• For consciousness, existence precedes and grounds any essence
• For idealism the object’s objective being is constituted by absence, not plenitude
• For Sartre, the For-itself is constituted by desire, so annihilating desire destroys consciousness itself.
• For Sartre, the Other is encountered as contingent fact, never constituted
• For the for-itself, permanence is what needs explaining, not change
• Free-will debates misfire because both sides miss how motives acquire their status
• Freedom and facticity are mutually condition each other’s existence.
• Freedom and situation are mutually constituting rather than opposites
• Freedom as choice retroactively constitutes the past as irremediable.
• Freedom cannot choose its own past but must exist through it.
• Freedom cannot choose itself and thus creates things and situation.
• Freedom chooses its being but cannot choose not to be
• Freedom constitutes its own obstacles by positing ends that render facticity restrictive.
• Freedom constitutes my being rather than attaching to it as a property
• Freedom exists only as engaged, self-choosing action, never as undetermined potential
• Freedom founds all connections and laws, then becomes bound by them
• Freedom from a fundamental project comes only through radical conversion, not will
• Freedom has no essence and therefore cannot be described like other things
• Freedom is a factual necessity, not an essence we can know
• Freedom is identical with the for-itself’s nothingness expressed as temporality, self-presence, and transcendence
• Freedom is not self-founded but thrown, creating its own facticity
• Freedom is only real once it chooses its own finitude.
• Freedom is synonymous with the for-itself’s lack of being
• Freedom is the being that makes itself a lack of being through desire
• Freedom is the for-itself’s permanent ability to nihilate its own being
• Freedom is the foundational condition of all action
• Freedom is the human capacity to put beings out of circuit behind a nothingness
• Freedom is the nihilation of a being it is, not something added later.
• Freedom is the original upsurge that posits one’s ultimate ends.
• Freedom makes itself into affliction, so liberating freedom from suffering betrays freedom
• Freedom means autonomy of choice, not success in obtaining one’s ends.
• Freedom means being perpetually on trial, awaiting ratification of one’s past.
• Freedom means choosing oneself within one’s world, not choosing the world itself.
• Freedom precedes essence and is indistinguishable from being human
• Freedom requires a perpetual renewal of self-choice without any support
• Freedom requires a resisting, brute world rather than being limited by it
• Freedom requires choosing one’s own essence, not merely one’s acts
• Freedom unifies past, present, and future into a single project.
• Freedom, choice, nihilation, and temporalization are one single act
• Freedom’s only limit is itself; we cannot choose not to be free
• Freedom’s real question is the price of acting otherwise, not whether one could
• Freedom’s responsibility falls on the self alone despite one’s un-chosen birth.
• Freudian and existential analyses both treat acts as symbols of deeper structures
• Freudian disguise mechanisms secretly require goal-directed consciousness they deny
• Fundamental choice can be revoked, so psychoanalytic symbols must shift
• Fundamental projects must be freely and continuously re-chosen rather than settled once
• Future free acts retroactively determine what our present conduct means.
• God is the hypostasized ideal of the impossible self-synthesis
• Grace disguises facticity by clothing the naked flesh in an invisible garment.
• Grace is the appearance of freedom embodied as necessity in the body-as-instrument.
• Grounding perception in figure-on-ground configuration requires original nihilation by attention
• Hate is the free choice to abolish the Other rather than unite with it.
• Having a past is not an external possession relation
• Having a past requires actively choosing it through the future-project.
• Having a place requires not being wholly absorbed in that place
• Having, doing, and being are the three cardinal categories subsuming all human conduct.
• Hegel makes being-for-others a necessary condition of being-for-itself
• Heidegger’s being-with is primordial co-existence, not interpersonal confrontation.
• Heidegger’s nothingness nihilates itself rather than being a Being
• Heidegger’s ontological being-with cannot explain concrete relations with particular others
• Heidegger’s positive descriptions of Dasein mask hidden negations
• Heidegger’s pre-ontological comprehension of being escapes the vicious circle
• Hetaeras serve as muses precisely because they combine flesh and consciousness
• Historians invoke subjective motives only when objective causes fail to explain an act
• Historization makes an existent gain a history by concrete involvement in an actual world.
• Human activities structurally embed negativity without any explicit negative judgment
• Human desire fundamentally aims at being one’s own foundation, a state called God.
• Human reality arises as a lack of an impossible self-totality
• Human reality becomes a totality only by surpassing each concrete negation
• Human reality consists of two ekstases, one into being and one into non-being
• Human reality creates place yet receives its own place without choice
• Human reality is an abortive project toward being its own self-cause
• Human reality is constituted as the unique foundation of nothingness within being.
• Human reality is the pure effort to become God, desire being its expression
• Husserl’s noema doctrine reduces being to appearing, a form of Berkeleyan idealism.
• Husserl’s Other is a constitutive category, not a real being
• Husserlian protentions cannot explain consciousness’s surpassing of itself toward the not-yet.
• I can neither direct nor escape the Other’s freedom.
• I negate the Other who is himself negating me
• Idealism reduces the object to non-being, a lack defined by absence
• Idealism’s self-enclosed monads are still separated by space
• If being consisted of manifesting essence, no pure being moment would be isolable
• If death’s moment is not self-chosen, our acts’ meaning escapes us
• Illness as a psychic state exists primarily as being-for-others
• Impure reflection constitutes the psyche while pure reflection requires a katharsis
• Impure reflection constitutes the reflected-on as an in-itself it must become.
• Impure reflection creates the psyche as a made-to-be virtual object
• In absorbed action teleological order reverses causal order
• In absorbed action there is no self inhabiting consciousness to qualify the acts
• In knowledge the knower is the absence that makes the known’s plenitude present
• In possession the for-itself seeks to become its own foundation as in-itself
• In reflection, the reflective and reflected-on are neither identical nor fully separate
• In the ‘they’ mode the world reflects one’s unauthentic possibilities back as interchangeable instruments.
• Individual acts express and are unchangeable apart from one’s original project
• Individual features are contingent forms of a necessary embodied existence
• Individual passions are surface expressions of one total fundamental project
• Intention requires a rupture with the given, illuminating being in light of non-being
• Intentions cannot derive from a given, only from a non-existent end
• Intentions constitute themselves as empty through self-conscious negation
• Internal negation alters the denied being’s inner structure by absence.
• Internal negation belongs exclusively to the for-itself, never to being-in-itself
• Internal negation binds the for-itself to the in-itself it denies
• Interruptions never genuinely surprise a person because freedom pre-structures the world’s indeterminacy
• Intimacy strips disguises to expose the other’s flesh as pure contingency
• Kafka’s opaque divine is the concept of the Other pushed to the limit
• Knowing aims to coincide with being yet is structured as not being it
• Knowing assimilates its object without destroying its in-itself structure
• Knowing is realizing being through an inner negating transcendence
• Knowing is the very being of the for-itself, not a relation
• Knowledge is a form of appropriation by the for-itself
• Knowledge is not a property but is the ekstatic being of the For-itself
• Knowledge of being presupposes the knower’s separation from the being known
• Lack is not accidental to human reality but constitutes its original mode of being.
• Lack is the deepest internal negation and appears only with human reality.
• Lack presupposes a totality that the existing and the lacking jointly compose
• Language is not invented but is the originary recognition of the Other.
• Language’s laws arise only through the free synthetic project of the speaker
• Legal right is distinct from the underlying appropriative tie between person and thing.
• Leibniz’s divine possibles are still only subjective representations.
• Leibnizian possibility is epistemic, relative only to our ignorance
• Life and action are identical in nature as transcended transcendence
• Life’s structure of waiting follows from the temporal nature of the for-itself
• Linguistic generalizations only reveal what the method of study looks for
• Liquidity and solids mask an ontological polarity within the in-itself
• Love fails because both parties cannot escape objectifying each other.
• Love is constitutively unstable across three distinct dimensions
• Love is the enterprise of pursuing an unrealizable unity with the Other
• Making the Other an object transcends and neutralizes his transcendence.
• Man is fundamentally the desire to be, a lack of being
• Manness is not an essence but something each for-itself freely sustains
• Masochism fails on principle because one can never apprehend one’s own objectivity
• Mathematical continuity only foreshadows but cannot found ekstatic being
• Memory poetically completes the past self with a plenitude of being
• Mental imagery itself requires a nihilating withdrawal of consciousness
• Metaphysics explains why this concrete world exists, as history explains particulars to sociology.
• Metaphysics studies individual world-genesis where ontology studies universal structures
• Motion cannot be understood while preserving the in-itself’s static identity
• Motion emerges only for the For-itself as the temporal constitution of space
• Motion is the least-being that never fully is
• Motion resists ontological derivation and must be accepted as a contingent fact
• Motive force never determines conduct because it is only ever possible
• Motives are constituted by projecting beyond a situation toward change
• My being-for-others is radically distinct from my being-for-myself
• My body is a point of view that others’ gazes always escape me
• My death is meaningful only through the Other who remains to preserve my meanings.
• My Ego-as-seen is structurally inaccessible to me, only lived in shame or pride
• My total project and the world as totality are strictly correlative notions.
• Mystic Nothingness serves as an ideal goal, unlike Sartre’s everyday concept
• Nausea is the nonpositional apprehension of one’s own contingent facticity, not a metaphor
• Nausea reveals facticity through the body’s inescapable belonging to being
• Necessity cannot be derived from possibility because possibility is epistemic, not ontological.
• Negation arises in consciousness as the nihilation of another’s projected possibility.
• Negation as a constituting act separates what is not factually distinct
• Negation cannot touch the plenitude of being; nothingness is denied at being’s heart
• Negation enters being only through human reality, not through being’s own dialectic.
• Negation enters the world through questioning, a pre-judicative relation to being.
• Negation inhabits everyday felt realities like absence and regret
• Negation is a constitutive structure of spatial distance itself
• Negation is constituted as ekstatic through its relation to the future
• Negation is presented to intuition as a double nihilation before any judgment is made
• Negation is the cement unifying spatial objects into Gestalt wholes
• Negation structures many everyday realities, not just judgments
• Negation without a future-directed engagement loses all meaning
• Negative judgments require surpassing the given toward an a priori ideal
• Neither my own existence nor the Other’s can be proved, only factually necessitated.
• Nihilation is the permanent self-determination not to be the in-itself
• No act of flight, even suicide, escapes the burden of choice
• No consciousness can be directly known by another consciousness
• No consciousness, not even God’s, can view reality’s totality from outside.
• No experience is ever purely subjective, being always object-directed.
• No factual state can by itself motivate any action
• Non-being appears within human expectation, not as pure subjectivity
• Nothing justifies the values a free being adopts since freedom grounds all values
• Nothingness grounds negation by being itself a negation, not an empty void
• Nothingness is a perpetual self-referential break within being, not a located entity.
• Nothingness is an act of being putting itself into question, unique to consciousness.
• Nothingness is expelled from being yet gives the world its outlines
• Nothingness is logically subsequent to being and always supposes a specified being
• Nothingness is logically subsequent to being, not its opposite.
• Object permanence derives from finite future potentiality, not infinite time
• Objectifying thought severs us from the world it claims to survey.
• Objective states of affairs become causes only through a for-itself’s project
• Obstacles are indispensable to freedom yet seem to condition it ontologically.
• Obstacles are never absolute but reveal their adversity only against a freely chosen end.
• One can act on the Other only once their freedom has collapsed.
• One is never identical with any of one’s own attitudes or actions
• One never gains concrete intuition of one’s own character as judged by the Other
• One’s death can be drawing nearer or receding without any observable change.
• One’s fundamental project determines the meaning of one’s past
• One’s own body escapes instrumental utilization unless mediated through the Other.
• One’s own possibilities become instruments for the Other’s aims
• One’s past is grounded in the world by becoming In-itself, losing transcendence.
• One’s place traces a chain of references back to the pure contingency of birth
• Only a being that makes itself its own lack can introduce lack.
• Only a being whose being is in question for itself can have a Future
• Only equally-positive terms can be logical opposites; non-being instead contradicts being.
• Only free choice can resolve an indeterminate chain of mutual objectification
• Only human reality brings the future into the world, not being-in-itself
• Only the dead remain permanent objects, never revealing themselves as subjects
• Only the for-itself has a past, the in-itself does not.
• Only the Other’s being, not the for-itself, contains death
• Ontology cannot predict the content of any individual’s free acts
• Ontology cannot prove that being’s self-foundation is the meaning of consciousness’ nihilation
• Ontology is descriptive while metaphysics is hypothetical and concerns origins
• Ontology specifies structures of being while metaphysics questions the existence of the existent
• Ontology terminates where psychoanalysis’s first principles begin.
• Oppressors only experience class unity as a feared object when the oppressed revolt
• Original projects of the for-itself are logically irreducible to any pre-existing motive.
• Original sin is the fact of existing among others.
• Others’ fixed labels of us are an unrealizable limit on our situation
• Others’ meanings present themselves to me as objective, not as my own choices
• Our fundamental project creates all the motives that could ever revise it
• Pain, illness, and disease form three distinct nested levels of bodily experience
• Pantheistic fusion still presupposes a pure negation making the world present as world
• Particular projects remain free choices rather than being determined by the global project
• Passing through a place means simultaneously being there and not being there
• Passive existence is conceptually unthinkable; only self-caused being is conceivable
• Past actions become irrevocable facts the for-itself cannot escape
• Past motives become objective things, collapsing the distinction between cause and motive
• Perceived personal permanence is borrowed from stable surroundings, not from the for-itself
• Perceived qualities exist objectively as the thing itself, not as subjective effects
• Perceiving another person’s body differs fundamentally from perceiving objects
• Perception grasps the Other’s gesture as a whole-body structure, not as parts plus judgment
• Perception is indistinguishable from the practical organization of the world into instruments
• Perception of bodies differs in original structure, not merely enrichment, from inanimate perception
• Perceptual differentiation retroactively presents objects as having always been in the prior undifferentiated ground.
• Perceptual unity arises from purposive traversal rather than passive observation
• Permanence is identical with abstractness, both rooted in the for-itself’s negation
• Personal possessions and surroundings concretely express one’s fundamental self-choice.
• Personal traits become meaningful to me only through my own chosen stance toward them.
• Philosophers err in assigning sense-organ relativity to my being rather than being-for-others.
• Photographs distort body parts because they lack the perceiver’s synthetic totality
• Physical distance does not modify the fundamental mutual presence of two consciousnesses
• Physical relativity is ontological, not merely epistemological
• Play releases subjectivity by letting the person posit their own rules
• Popular resistance to relativity stems from treating motion as external to being
• Positing oneself as object before an absolute non-objective subject produces fear and alienation.
• Possession aims at appropriating being-in-itself and symbolically the whole world.
• Possession in desire is a double reciprocal incarnation of both bodies
• Possession is a continuous creation that grants objects their functional being.
• Possession is a lived, non-thetic relation rather than a known one.
• Possession is a magical relation projecting the ideal of the in-itself-for-itself
• Possession is an ideal symbolic relation that no concrete act can fully realize
• Possession is an internal bond of being, not an external relation
• Possession is enjoyed only through use, never through contemplation.
• Possibilities often reveal themselves only through the very act of realizing them
• Possibility arises only through a being that comprehends and embodies its own possibles.
• Possibility exists only as an option on being that separates one from oneself
• Possibility is a concrete property of already existing beings, not a subjective construct
• Pre-reflective consciousness is itself a form of self-consciousness
• Presence to being defines the For-itself’s fundamental ontological structure
• Presence to being is a negative internal bond that negates what it confronts
• Presence to being requires no third-term witness, not even God
• Present projects retroactively decide whether a past period counts as continuous or repudiated
• Pride is a flight from shame and so already enacts bad faith.
• Prior psychic forms motivate later ones as whole objects acting at a distance
• Psychic causality cannot be mechanical or constant-succession, only magic action at a distance
• Psychic states act on each other magically and resist intellectualistic causal explanation
• Psychic states are grasped only as shadows projected by reflected-on consciousness
• Psychic temporality hypostasizes original ekstatic temporality and thus conceals an unresolvable contradiction.
• Psychic temporality is constituted by reflection, not original temporality
• Psychic well-being fundamentally depends on the existence of public space
• Psychoanalysis converts each behavior’s hidden revelation into conceptual form
• Psychoanalysis explains self-deception as a lie without a liar
• Psychoanalysis posits drives and prohibitions as disconnected givens, splitting human unity
• Psychoanalytic insight works only if the subject was already conscious of his drives
• Psychoanalytic self-knowledge requires treating oneself as an external object
• Psychoanalytic truth remains alien because the patient cannot derive it from his own situation
• Psychological explanations that stop at irreducible character traits beg the question
• Psychological guilt stems from evading one’s absolute freedom through bad faith
• Pure apparition is always perceived as a dynamic emergence from nothingness
• Pure knowledge without a viewpoint is self-contradictory
• Pure spontaneous consciousness can neither act upon nor be acted upon by things.
• Qualities interpenetrate so fully they are one single being, not law-bound parts
• Qualities’ meaning requires the for-itself’s nihilating mediation to exist
• Quality is constituted by the for-itself’s negating acts, not given in things
• Quality reveals being only to a nothingness that negates it
• Quality reveals itself as absolute proximity that nevertheless refers us to our own emptiness
• Questioning presupposes that humans are not fully determined by the causal order
• Radical freedom makes each person wholly responsible for their epoch
• Rational reflection is always weaker than the illusions it dispels
• Reaching a projected future never delivers what was awaited, yielding structural disillusion
• Reason works as conscious projection that holds subject and object apart.
• Recognizing death’s contingency actually frees us from its alleged constraint.
• Reconstructing a person from separate desires is methodologically unsound
• Reflection aims impossibly to unify the for-itself with itself into a totality
• Reflection aims to make the self-coincident being that consciousness can never simply be
• Reflection cannot be modeled as knowledge of knowledge without regress
• Reflection deepens the reflective-reflected split beyond self-consciousness
• Reflection divides into pure and impure kinds, distinguished by their relation to temporality
• Reflection emerges as a new consciousness living in symbiosis with the consciousness reflected-on.
• Reflection is a second attempt by the for-itself to found itself
• Reflection is an intermediate stage of nihilation between self-existence and existence-for-others
• Reflection is consciousness attempting to become its own object
• Reflection is defined as the failed effort of the for-itself to found itself
• Reflection is structurally possible because the for-itself splits into reflecting and reflected
• Reflection is the for-itself grounding itself as a for-itself
• Reflection reveals temporality as the historicity of the for-itself
• Reflection splits consciousness in a split never completed
• Reflection transforms lived pain into a psychic object at a distance
• Reflection’s privileged certitude is threatened because the reflected-on consciousness is always past.
• Reflective consciousness alone can dissociate itself from what it posits
• Reflective consciousness discloses values as the meaning of what is lacked
• Reflective self-recovery produces only distance and reflective nothingness
• Refusal to take a stance on one’s identity is itself a stance.
• Relations with the Other form a closed circle, never a progressing dialectic.
• Relative and passive properties describe modes of being, never being itself
• Replacing one essentialist subject with another leaves inverted essentialism intact
• Revolt requires a double nihilation of both ideal and actual states
• Risking one’s life demonstrates freedom from determination
• Roles are enacted, never inhabited, because identity would collapse into inert being
• Sadism collapses when flesh resists instrumental use, reverting to desire
• Sadism fails because the victim’s transcendent freedom fundamentally escapes capture
• Sadism founders because enslaving another’s freedom is inherently self-contradictory.
• Sadism is an illusory attempt to capture freedom through flesh
• Sadism is the attempt to reverse grace’s relation, making facticity contain hidden freedom.
• Sadism originates in desire’s failure to sustain reciprocal incarnation
• Sadism seeks to capture an unconditioned freedom within a determined technical mechanism
• Sartre calls being-for-others characteristics unrealizables
• Sartre exposes a circular argument in Heidegger’s individualization of death.
• Sartre rejects Hegel for treating Non-being as independent rather than dependent on Being.
• Sartre rejects the Cartesian split of free will from determined passions
• Sartre’s free transparent consciousness leads him to reject the unconscious and all psychological determinism
• Sartre’s look-theory precludes a totalized we-object
• Sartre’s philosophy is neither idealism nor realism but a third position
• Science cannot eliminate potentiality and must actually presuppose it
• Scientific knowledge of the senses remains fully inside the world of objects
• Scientific time hypostasizes dispersion into a single substantial being
• Seduction works by presenting one’s object-ness as a fascinating fullness of being
• Seeing a body part detached from its whole produces an uncanny horror response
• Self-avoidance differs from hiding external objects because the self is translucent
• Self-consciousness extends the cogito beyond the instant into one’s global project
• Self-consciousness is not an added quality layered onto a psychic event
• Self-consciousness is the sole mode of existence for any consciousness of something
• Self-consciousness need not posit the self as an object
• Self-consciousness only becomes truth through the Other’s recognition
• Self-deceiving freedom is the most deeply human condition
• Self-foundation would require existing at a distance from oneself, collapsing into for-itself structures.
• Self-perception is impossible because the for-itself is contingency
• Selfness arises when the possible I am is reflected as absent-presence
• Selfness means man is always separated from himself by being
• Sensation involves a magical inherence of lived and living rather than spatial belonging
• Senses are inapprehensible because we encounter only objects, never sensory activity
• Senses are not subjective channels but objective rules of worldly revelation.
• Sensory qualities already carry moral meaning and are not later enriched by projection.
• Sequential descriptive psychology leaves every causal transition unexplained
• Sexuality is a fundamental structure of being-for-others, not a mere physiological accident
• Sexuality is an ontological structure of the For-itself, not a physiological given
• Shame at nakedness symbolizes the human condition of being seen as an object.
• Shame is fundamentally experienced in the presence of another person
• Shame is the recognition of being as the Other sees one
• Shame, fear, and pride all recognize the Other as an unreachable subject.
• Simultaneity only becomes possible through another consciousness’s presence
• Sincerity aims at an ideal mode of being human nature prevents attaining
• Sincerity is an unrealizable ideal because human reality never coincides with identity.
• Sincerity is impossible because consciousness’s structure prevents being what one is
• Sincerity reveals itself as a form of bad faith
• Sincerity shares the same structure as bad faith and can collapse into it
• Situation arises from freely chosen ends colliding with surrounding facticity.
• Situation is neither objective nor subjective but a relation of surpassing.
• Situation is the fused double determination of freedom and facticity
• Situation-limits are given meaning only by the freedom they nevertheless bound
• Skiing transforms snow through the skier’s activity into meaningful lived terrain
• Sliding achieves mastery in depth without plunging into matter
• Sliminess symbolizes a possible fusion of for-itself and in-itself
• So-called sensory relativity is really objective contradiction resolved by free choice.
• Social categories like worker and bourgeois arise only through the look
• Social identity is constituted by one’s free manner of adopting it.
• Solipsism cannot be refuted by assurance arguments alone
• Some secondary possibles vary freely without altering fundamental project
• Space adds nothing to being but is continuously spatialized through the For-itself’s ekstatic temporalization
• Space is constituted by the For-itself’s organizing of relations between objects
• Speech is built from whole sentences, not pre-existing words
• Speech’s apparent impersonal life is borrowed from the personal freedom of speakers.
• Spoken words are interpreted against a background of situational context, not in isolation.
• Spontaneity can only produce itself, never act on externals
• Sport is an appropriative project that transforms worldly environment into a supporting element.
• Subjectivity here means being unable to get out of oneself, a closed box
• Subordinated suffering must be negated in consciousness before it can motivate action
• Sudden death cannot be awaited because it is indeterminate in date
• Suffering becomes unbearable only once a better alternative is conceivable
• Suicide cannot escape absurdity because it too awaits a future meaning it denies itself
• Supreme value is the unconditional beyond of all surpassings
• Taste organizes density, temperature, and time into a unified experienced being
• Tastes encode a whole choice of being rather than sexual or physiological facts
• Temporal passage is one global modification, not two separate events
• Temporal succession is a uniting division, not sheer separation
• Temporal unity cannot be rebuilt from atemporal substances
• Temporality cannot be derived from atemporal being or imposed upon it
• Temporality exists only as the intra-structure of the For-itself, which temporalizes itself.
• Temporality is an internal structure of the For-itself, not external to it
• Temporality is the necessary horizon for the for-itself’s transcendence
• The ‘this’ reveals the concrete negation the for-itself has to be
• The ‘us’ experience means being objects together before alienating others.
• The ‘we’ is a contingent individual experience, not an ontological structure or collective consciousness.
• The absurdity of choice lives in a felt unjustifiability that freedom itself generates
• The ambiguity of speech emerges only for the listener, not the speaker
• The appearance has its own being and refers to nothing behind it
• The being of appearances may differ in kind from appearances of being
• The being of phenomena is not a hidden noumenal world behind them
• The being of the perceived remains relative to consciousness yet demands independent examination.
• The body as facticity is grounded in the nihilation of the in-itself at birth.
• The body cannot be simultaneously an object and the subject that reveals the world
• The body constitutes meaning and marks the limits of interpersonal relations
• The body functions as a sign surpassed toward meaning
• The body is a permanent structure of being, not a contingent addition.
• The body is a unity like hand-glass, not hand plus action
• The body is apprehended non-thetically as fatigue while consciousness attends to the world
• The body is necessary to the for-itself yet manifests its contingency
• The body is revealed to us by instrumental things, not by itself
• The body is the contingent form assumed by the necessity of one’s contingency.
• The body is the instrument that cannot be used like other instruments
• The body seen from another’s viewpoint is a thing, not lived
• The body-for-the-Other constrains precisely because it can never be grasped
• The body’s action on matter reveals qualities that already dwell latent within it
• The body’s immobility as surpassed facticity is the pure in-itself
• The body’s substratum is only apprehended in the corpse
• The censor alone can recognize what it represses and resist the analyst’s approach
• The certainty of being looked-at is only ever probable, not guaranteed.
• The cogito’s deepest meaning is to refer outside itself
• The cogito’s self-apprehension is first a grasp of its own contingency.
• The compulsion power of one’s past derives from free choice, not its content
• The dead persist only through the survivor’s freedom that carries them
• The demand for sincere self-recognition may itself be a form of bad faith.
• The desire to do ultimately reduces to a desire to be
• The desire to know is ultimately a relation of appropriation
• The desire to possess aims at unity with the object
• The Disease is constituted as an object belonging to others, not to me
• The duality of negations grounding being-for-others is irreducible to any synthesis
• The dynamic of duration raises two distinct problems about the Past and Present
• The Ego appears only when consciousness reflects on itself.
• The Ego exists as an object of pre-reflective consciousness, not as a repudiated entity.
• The Ego is a transcendent in-itself, not of consciousness’s nature.
• The Ego is a transcendent unity of states, qualities, and acts
• The environment is revealed only through and within one’s free project
• The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself
• The facticity of place only becomes an obstacle through freedom’s original project
• The For-itself adds nothing to being except its own negation
• The For-itself becomes itself by negating the Other.
• The for-itself becomes itself only by assuming its alienated being-for-others
• The For-itself can only found itself by projecting toward a future it never reaches
• The For-itself constitutes its Future by perpetually apprehending itself as unachieved
• The for-itself constitutes itself by choosing and projecting concrete possibles
• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing
• The for-itself constitutes the world’s totality through radical negation
• The for-itself depends on the in-itself through an internal relation
• The For-itself derives all its powers precisely from not being Being
• The for-itself desires to be its own foundation without annihilating its consciousness.
• The For-itself has only marginal, borrowed being derived from what it nihilates.
• The for-itself historicizes the world by constituting others’ free acts as objective techniques.
• The For-itself is a lack temporally outstripping and lagging itself
• The For-itself is a particular privation, not a general Nothingness.
• The for-itself is a relation to the world, not a separate entity
• The for-itself is defined as an internal negation of the in-itself, bridged through knowledge
• The for-itself is defined by self-withdrawal rather than self-identity
• The For-itself is diasporatic, dispersed into several dimensions of being which the In-itself lacks.
• The for-itself is fully responsible for its being yet cannot justify or choose it
• The for-itself is its past yet cannot posit or thematize it
• The for-itself is necessarily haunted by value and its own possibilities
• The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself
• The for-itself is only the emptiness where the in-itself detaches
• The for-itself is originally dispersed outside itself and must seek its being elsewhere
• The For-itself is process rather than entity
• The For-itself is responsible for how it apprehends qualities of things
• The for-itself is simultaneously nihilation and, via the Other, a thing
• The for-itself is the in-itself’s failed self-founding that nihilates it
• The for-itself lacks a for-itself, not an in-itself, in its project of self-identification
• The for-itself learns what it is by recovering its being through the world
• The For-itself necessarily exists in three ekstatic dimensions of not-being itself.
• The for-itself radically excludes all objectivity by its own mode of being
• The For-itself retroactively constitutes the past from which it appears born
• The for-itself unifies scattered negations into a detotalized polyvalent negation
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence
• The for-itself’s free spontaneity makes the Other’s existence possible
• The for-itself’s freedom renders all possibles as nothings, forever hollowed from within
• The for-itself’s interrogative being keeps consciousness in perpetual suspense
• The for-itself’s lack is internal to it, not imposed from outside
• The for-itself’s negation of being has a future-extending ekstatic dimension
• The for-itself’s presence creates the very distinction between this and that
• The for-itself’s project is a concrete individual choice, not an abstract universal
• The for-itself’s relation to its future is a project toward its own suppression
• The for-itself’s responsibility extends to the whole peopled world
• The for-itself’s self-nihilation is the answer to its own contingency puzzle.
• The for-itself’s self-relation constitutes the world as circuitry of selfness.
• The for-whom does not break the instrumental chain of for-whats
• The Freudian unconscious cannot explain bad faith because it fragments psychic unity.
• The Freudian unconscious reintroduces a deceiver-deceived duality rather than explaining bad faith
• The fundamental project is the for-itself’s choice of its own being-in-the-world.
• The fundamental relation between consciousnesses is conflict, not solidarity
• The future is a lack the For-itself must be, not a not-yet now
• The Future is the self awaited as the completion of what it lacks
• The future project, not chronology, organizes the layers of one’s past.
• The given never conditions freedom because freedom is its internal negation
• The haunting shape in Freud’s text can only be known through its effects.
• The human body remains contingent and superfluous even in decomposition.
• The human ideal of God is a self-contradictory synthesis of the in-itself and for-itself
• The human race is constituted by free individual choices, not vice versa
• The humanistic Us-object is an unattainable ideal demanding the correlative concept of God
• The ideal of loving unity with the Other is structurally unrealizable and breeds conflict
• The ideal of possession is an impossible synthesis of assimilation and resistance
• The image is constituted by a nihilating structure, not by revived perception
• The in-itself and for-itself are two radically separated regions of being
• The in-itself cannot relate to its past because pure being excludes all negation
• The in-itself has no need of the for-itself to be
• The in-itself is fully self-coincident, leaving no gap for nothingness
• The in-itself is pure actuality; possibility enters the world only through human reality
• The In-itself’s full being makes the emergence of consciousness inexplicable
• The inactive past cannot reach the present except through an ekstatic being
• The incommunicable diversity of times resists unifying two consciousnesses
• The individual’s concrete being grounds and fills the universal, not vice versa
• The ineffectiveness of motives itself constitutes the condition of freedom.
• The inferiority complex is freely chosen rather than unconsciously suffered.
• The instant arises only when a project’s end coincides with its successor’s beginning.
• The instant dissolves the world into disconnected atoms whose passage becomes philosophically inexplicable
• The instant is only a nothingness; we perceive only continuous temporalization.
• The intuition of contingency is not identical with a feeling of guilt.
• The living for-itself is what brings its past into being-in-the-world.
• The look cannot itself be looked at; it vanishes when objectified.
• The look holds certainty that cannot transfer to the Other as object.
• The look splits me into a for-itself and an unknowable being-for-others
• The love enterprise’s true ideal is self-alienated freedom.
• The love of neighbor commandment functions to preserve the self-other distinction
• The lover demands to be chosen absolutely, not as one among others
• The lover’s demand for totality structurally mirrors the Stoic sage’s ideal
• The lover’s self-presentation demands the Other’s free recognition to succeed
• The master’s self-certainty remains incomplete because the slave’s recognition is non-essential
• The meaning death confers on a life stays suspended, awaiting history’s own meaning
• The meaning of a person’s past stays in suspense until death
• The meaning of historical events remains perpetually in suspense
• The meaning of one’s place depends entirely on the project one chooses.
• The mind-body problem arises from confusing my body-for-me with the body-as-object.
• The noema is the intended object pole of consciousness after bracketing
• The nothing beyond being constitutes the circuit of selfness
• The nothingness separating self and Other precedes and founds all relation
• The object is both fully within each appearance and totally beyond the whole series
• The obscene is revealed facticity stripped of its acts and situation
• The obstacles that limit freedom are constituted only by freedom’s own posited ends
• The oppressive class lacks internal unity because its members deny class membership
• The original relation between thises is external negation effected by the For-itself
• The other as object is grasped through the tool-world he organizes around himself
• The Other cannot be known as an object because objects are only ever probable
• The Other cannot coherently organize my experience given the structure of experience itself
• The Other escapes phenomenological reduction and is not in the world
• The Other exists for consciousness as a prenumerical refused self
• The Other grounds my objectivity rather than being inferred by analogy from myself
• The Other is a concrete particular condition, not a formal category, of self-awareness
• The Other is aimed at as phenomenon, never as noumenal reality
• The Other is an invisible presence that supports shame without being an object
• The Other is constituted by negation as the self which is not myself
• The Other is the being through whom I can attain any objective self-knowledge
• The other must be given before objects can appear as manufactured.
• The Other relates to self through reciprocal internal negation, forming a detotalized totality
• The Other resists concept-status because he radically negates rather than extends my experience.
• The Other-as-look resists being derived from one’s own consciousness or categories
• The Other-as-object reinforces the world’s objectivity while the Other-as-look dissolves it
• The Other-as-object resists reduction to his underlying subjectivity
• The Other-as-subject can in no way be known or conceived as such
• The Other’s appearance or absence changes nothing in the fundamental relation to him.
• The Other’s body is given as his facticity regardless of presence or absence.
• The Other’s body is ontologically identical to the Other-for-me
• The other’s body is originally given as being-in-situation
• The Other’s character is his facticity, given only to be surpassed
• The Other’s existence gives rise to collective ownership of world-appropriation techniques.
• The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity.
• The Other’s existence is certain while the Other’s identity as this object never is.
• The Other’s existence is disclosed, not abstractly proven
• The Other’s freedom becomes a limit only through one’s own free choice.
• The Other’s freedom is the sole separation between my self and the Other
• The Other’s gaze imposes unchosen determinations on my being
• The Other’s gaze reveals one’s own nausea as fleshly object.
• The Other’s inner experiences are constitutively inaccessible to my perception yet organize my field
• The Other’s look displaces my world’s center and objectifies me.
• The Other’s look freezes one’s free project into a fixed character.
• The Other’s look makes one’s own possibilities into ambivalent instruments
• The Other’s look makes the self haunt an unreflective consciousness
• The Other’s look proves a beyond-the-world realm irreducible to spatial relations
• The Other’s look reveals my body as an object-for-others
• The Other’s look turns the free for-itself into a fixed thing
• The Other’s mutual negation is required for being-for-others, not merely my own
• The Other’s necessity is contingent facticity, like the cogito’s indubitability
• The Other’s objective body cannot itself produce my objectification under his gaze
• The Other’s objectivity is a real qualification I confer, not a refraction
• The Other’s perspective reveals my own body as merely worldly
• The Other’s prenumerical presence is lost in both concrete enumeration and abstract unification
• The Other’s presence is a brute fact irreducibly distinct from the for-itself’s own facticity.
• The Other’s presence resists phenomenological reduction and doubt
• The Other’s worldly presence is not analytically derivable from its transcendent subjectivity.
• The past cannot be constructed from present elements alone
• The past is a for-itself that has hardened into an in-itself
• The past is a free choice made from the present project
• The Past is a non-thetic, lived bond with the world and self
• The past is an in-itself whose content can neither be changed nor added to
• The past is fixed being while the future remains modifiable by freedom
• The past is kept in suspense by the perpetual expectation that freedom generates.
• The past is not an accretion but a necessary structural feature of the For-itself.
• The past is only meaningful through the end one currently chooses
• The past is the only essence a for-itself ever possesses
• The past is value reversed, being fixed in-itself as pure gratuitous fact
• The past remains unthematizable yet inescapable for the for-itself
• The past yields no imperative, being only indicative fact
• The past’s fixed in-itself character requires the for-itself to identify with itself
• The past’s force and meaning depend entirely on present projects
• The past’s honorary existence fails because it explains no causal connection to the present
• The perceived object is always surpassed toward the self’s own possibilities
• The perceived object is irreducible to the consciousness that perceives it.
• The permanence of things is constituted by one’s own ongoing project.
• The person is defined as a free relation to oneself
• The plurality of consciousnesses is a synthesis whose totality remains inconceivable.
• The possible is a lack constitutive of consciousness itself
• The possible is a real lack the For-itself projects beyond itself.
• The possible is defined as a lack that qualifies the for-itself against its past.
• The possible is understood either as subjective ignorance or as divine thought.
• The pre-reflective cogito is non-personal and contains no Ego
• The present as pure being is an infinitesimal instant that reduces to nothingness
• The present is a perpetual flight from being rather than a moment
• The project of bad faith must itself be in bad faith
• The Psyche is the object of impure reflection, not of unreflective consciousness.
• The psychic body gives psychic phenomena a substrate of contingency grounded in materiality.
• The psychic body is the body as passive matter projected into the in-itself.
• The psychic object is constituted in the past, not in lived temporality
• The psychoanalytic censor must be conscious of itself, hence in bad faith
• The question of life’s meaning arises only on the reflective level
• The question why being exists is meaningless; contingency is being’s root
• The relation to my judged self is ontological, not epistemic
• The same fatigue is lived as loving appropriation within a vaster project
• The self flees each negation toward a complementary negation whose fusion reveals the in-itself
• The self I am depends on a future self it cannot determine
• The Self-as-object is a limit between two consciousnesses, not a thing
• The self-as-object is the only possible separation between two consciousnesses
• The serious attitude makes a person a passive consequence of the world
• The sincerity demanded by critics is itself a form of bad faith.
• The situation fuses freedom’s projects with brute contingency indistinguishably
• The situation is things plus myself, not impressions, revealing brute facticity.
• The slimy haunts consciousness as its own feared dissolution into facticity
• The slimy offers itself as a global rubric for classifying all things
• The slimy reveals itself only within the appropriative project as an opaque, dense meaning
• The slimy reverses possession so that the For-itself is possessed
• The slimy symbolizes the In-itself absorbing the For-itself
• The slimy’s horror is the fear that facticity will absorb the For-itself
• The speech-thought circle is the ekstatic structure of situation itself, not a linguistic defect
• The spirit of seriousness treats values as absolute rather than made by human freedom
• The three ekstases structure temporality, reflection, and the encounter with the Other
• The totality of for-itself and in-itself differs from for-others by its absence of reciprocity
• The totality toward which human reality strives is itself, not a transcendent God.
• The ultimate possibility is the unitary synthesis of all actual possibles, not death.
• The universal future is an abstract, indifferent container emptied of ekstatic meaning.
• The upsurge of freedom and the revelation of the given are simultaneous and inseparable
• The voluntary act requires reflective consciousness, while involuntary spontaneity remains purely unreflective
• The We-experience is secondary to and dependent on prior knowledge of the Other.
• The We-subject experience is a subjective psychological event, not an ontological relation
• The We-subject experience is psychological, not ontological, and never truly unifies for-itselfs.
• The We-subject experience is unstable and carries no metaphysical weight
• The will can reshape details but never its originating fundamental project
• The will to dominate presupposes sadism, not vice versa
• The word “and” expresses an external negation separating thises
• The world’s instrumental organization depends partly on constituting consciousness
• The world’s meaningful organization arises from the For-itself’s upsurge
• The world’s perceived order always implies a center that we are yet cannot objectify
• There are no accidents in a life; even conscription is a choice
• Things are primordially instrumental-things, not things that later become instruments
• Time divides analytically into a static before-after order and a dynamic flowing course.
• Time is constituted by the For-itself’s nothingness rather than inhering in objects
• Time’s articulated lapse collapses back into atemporality when not lived toward our own possibles.
• To affirm an object is simultaneously to deny that I am it.
• To love is always to want to be loved in return, generating indefinite regress.
• To love is essentially to project being loved by the Other.
• Tolerance and even abstention also violate the Other’s freedom.
• Total being’s unity risks transferring the being-hiatus into each existent
• Totality of being arises only through the detotalized for-itself
• Treating humans as permanent substances dissolves real temporality into mere measure
• Treating language as a self-running nature reduces humans to pilots of inert forces.
• Treating motion as an accident of being makes rest and motion indistinguishable
• Treating time as a series of nows annihilates past, present, and future alike
• Truth about persons is grasped a priori, not discovered by empirical search
• Two primitive attitudes structure all my relations with the Other.
• Under the Other’s gaze I become an instrumental complex ordered around the look
• Understanding an act relates parts to total project, not deduction
• Understanding speech requires projecting oneself toward the speaker’s possible ends.
• Ungraceful movement exposes the performer’s raw unadapted facticity to others
• Unreflective consciousness holds implicit self-awareness without knowledge
• Urban meanings resist my choice and present as thing-like as the in-itself
• Value arises from the for-itself’s constitutive lack
• Value is intuited only as a beyond of concrete acts
• Value is the absent in-itself that consciousness perpetually surpasses toward
• Value’s being consists precisely in not having being
• Voluntary self-reform can succeed on symptoms without altering the fundamental project.
• Waiting for an event requires determinate causal processes, which death lacks.
• Water symbolizes the for-itself because its fluidity mirrors consciousness.
• We-subject feeling is a solipsistic illusion with no real social being
• Western epistemology’s root metaphors sexualize and dominate the known
• What one creates or owns remains always oneself, never genuinely other.
• What the sadist really seeks to appropriate is the Other’s freedom, not the flesh.
• What-is-not determines what-is in the human world.
• Will concerns method of attaining an already posited end, not choosing the end itself
• Without the for-itself there is no world, only undifferentiated being.