The Other-as-object resists reduction to his underlying subjectivity
Evidence
Thus this relation which I call “being-seen-by-another,” far from being merely one of the relations signified by the word man, represents an irreducible fact which can not be deduced either from the essence of the Other-as-object, or from my being-as-subject. On the contrary, if the concept of the Other-as-object is to have any meaning, this can be only as the result of the conversion and the degradation of that original relation. In a word, my apprehension of the Other in the world as probably being a man refers to my permanent possibility of being-seen-by-him; that is, to the permanent possibility that a subject who sees me may be substituted for the object seen by me. “Being-seen-by-the-Other” is the truth of “seeing-the-Other.” Thus the notion of the Other can not under any circumstances aim at a solitary, extra-mundane consciousness which I can not even think. The man is defined by his relation to the world and by his relation to myself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 722 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: A look already captured by the Other cannot objectify what he already fixes; The Other’s presence resists phenomenological reduction and doubt; The Other-as-object reinforces the world’s objectivity while the Other-as-look dissolves it (+8 more)
Broader Connections
- Being-seen-by-the-Other is the foundational relation from which the Other-as-object is derived
#expands(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 722 - The Other’s objective body cannot itself produce my objectification under his gaze
#expands(0.82)