The past is kept in suspense by the perpetual expectation that freedom generates.

Evidence

My past therefore is a concrete and precise proposition which as such awaits ratification. This is certainly one of the meanings which Kafka’s The Trial tries to bring to light, the characteristic in human reality of being perpetually in court. To be free is to have one’s freedom perpetually on trial. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1191 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Since freedom is choice, it is change. It is defined by the end which it projects; that is, by the future which it has to be. But precisely because the future is the not-yet-existing-state of what is, it can be conceived only within a narrow connection with what is. It is not possible that what is should illuminate what is not yet, for what is is a lack and consequently can be known as such only in terms of that which it lacks. The end illuminates what is. But to go looking for the end to-come in order by means of it to make known that-which-is, requires being already beyond what-is in a nihilating withdrawal which makes what-is appear clearly in the state of an isolated-system. What-is, therefore, takes on its meaning only when it is surpassed toward the future. Therefore what-is is the past. We see how the past as “that which is to be changed” is indispensable to the choice of the future and how consequently no free surpassing can be effected except in terms of a past, but we can see too how the very nature of the past comes to the past from the original choice of a future. In particular the irremediable quality of the past comes from my actual choice of the future; if the past is that in terms of which I conceive and project a new state of things in the future, then the past itself is that which is left in place, that which consequently is itself outside all perspective of change. Thus in order for the future to be realizable, it is necessary that the past be irremediable. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1178 (#expands, via linked claim)

WE have a past. Of course we have been able to establish that this past does not determine our acts as a prior phenomenon determines a consequent phenomenon; we have shown that the past is without force to constitute the present and to sketch out the future. Nevertheless the fact remains that the freedom which escapes toward the future can not give itself any past it likes according to its fancy; there are even more compelling reasons for the fact that it can not produce itself without a past. It has to be its own past, and this past is irremediable. … If the past does not determine our actions, at least it is such that we can not take a new decision except in terms of it. … Thus the importance of the past can not be exaggerated since for me “Wesen ist was gewesen ist,” essence is what has been. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1177 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The past is fixed being while the future remains modifiable by freedom — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 454; Freedom means being perpetually on trial, awaiting ratification of one’s past. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1191; Freedom can objectify its own past, rupturing temporal continuity with the instant (+8 more)

Broader Connections