Only the for-itself has a past, the in-itself does not.

Evidence

There is a past only for a present which cannot exist without being its past—back there, behind itself; that is, only those beings have a past which are such that in their being, their past being is in question, those beings who have to be their past. … It is through the for-itself that the past arrives in the world because its “I am” is in the form of an I am me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 422

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the ontological difference between for-itself and in-itself in terms of having vs. being one’s past.
• XREF: This distinction (in-itself has no past) recurs as the backdrop to Beauvoir’s account of transcendence and historically situated freedom. — connects to: The past’s fixed in-itself character requires the for-itself to identify with itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 427; The past is a for-itself that has hardened into an in-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 434; The past remains unthematizable yet inescapable for the for-itself (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• The for-itself is only the emptiness where the in-itself detaches #corroborates (0.88) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 576
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• The in-itself cannot relate to its past because pure being excludes all negation #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 414