Desire is consciousness troubled by its own inapprehensible facticity

Evidence

But if I desire a house or a glass of water or a woman’s body, how could this body, this glass, this piece of property reside in my desire, and how can my desire be anything but the consciousness of these objects as desirable? Let us beware then of considering these desires as little psychic entities dwelling in consciousness; they are consciousness itself in its original projective, transcendent structure, for consciousness is on principle consciousness of something. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1316 (#expands, via linked claim)

Desire therefore does not come to consciousness as heat comes to the piece of iron which I hold near the flame. Consciousness chooses itself as desire. For this, of course, there must be a motive; I do not desire just anything at any time. But as we showed in Part One of this book, the motive is raised in terms of the past, and consciousness by turning back upon it, confers on the motive its weight and its value. There is therefore no difference between the choice of the motive of the desire and the meaning of the upsurge—in the three ekstatic dimensions of duration—of a consciousness which makes itself desiring. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 979 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: For Sartre, the For-itself is constituted by desire, so annihilating desire destroys consciousness itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 59; Facticity neither determines who we are nor resists us independently of consciousness — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 343; Desire proves human reality is constituted as a lack — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 354 (+11 more)

Broader Connections