The For-itself derives all its powers precisely from not being Being

Evidence

The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is present to consciousness as not being consciousness. The original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. But as negation comes to the world by means of the for-itself, and as the thing is what it is in the absolute indifference of identity, it can not be the thing which is posited as not being the for-itself. Negation comes from the for-itself. We should not conceive this negation as a type of judgment which would bear on the thing itself and deny concerning it that it is the for-itself; this type of negation could be conceived only if the for-itself were a substance already fully formed, and even in that case it could emanate only as a third being establishing from outside a negative relation between two beings. But by the original negation the for-itself constitutes itself as not being the thing. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571 (#expands, via linked claim)

In addition my possibilities do not exist but are possibilized because they are eaten away from within by my freedom; that is, whatever my possible may be, its opposite is equally possible. I can shatter this inkwell but I can just as well put it in a drawer. I can aim at the full moon beyond the crescent moon, but I can just as well insist on the permanence of the crescent as such. Consequently the inkwell is found to be provided with equivalent possibilities: to be put in a drawer, to be shattered. This crescent moon can be an open curve in the sky or a disk held in suspense. Those potentialities which refer back to the this without being made to be by it and without having to be—those we shall call probabilities to indicate that they exist in the mode of being of the in-itself. We cannot say that my possibles are; they are possibilized. But probabilities are not “probabilized,” they are each one in itself as probable. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 612 (#expands, via linked claim)

But if it is true that the connection between a consciousness and life does not distort the nature of the “abstract moment of self-consciousness” which remains there, immersed, always capable of being discovered, is the case the same for objectivity? In other words, since we know that a consciousness is before being known, then is not a known consciousness wholly modified by the very fact that it is known? Is “to appear as an object for a consciousness” still “to be consciousness”? It is easy to reply to this question: the very being of self-consciousness is such that in its being, its being is in question; this means that it is pure interiority. It is perpetually a reference to a self which it has to be. Its being is defined by this: that it is this being in the mode of being what it is not and of not being what it is. Its being, therefore, is the radical exclusion of all objectivity. I am the one who can not be an object for myself, the one who can not even conceive for myself of existence in the form of an object (save on the plane of the reflective dissociation—but we have seen that reflection is the drama of the being who can not be an object for himself). This is not because of the lack of detachment or because of an intellectual prejudice or of a limit imposed on my knowledge, but because objectivity demands an explicit negation: the object is what I make myself not-be whereas I myself am what I make myself be. I pursue myself everywhere, I can not escape myself, I reapprehend myself from behind. Even if I could attempt to make myself an object, I would already be myself at the heart of that object which I am; and at the very center of that object I should have to be the subject who is looking at it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 694 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The for-itself is fully responsible for its being yet cannot justify or choose it — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 343; The for-itself radically excludes all objectivity by its own mode of being — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 694; The in-itself has no need of the for-itself to be — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1439 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571
• The for-itself’s freedom renders all possibles as nothings, forever hollowed from within #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 612
• The for-itself radically excludes all objectivity by its own mode of being #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 694
• The in-itself has no need of the for-itself to be #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1439
• The For-itself adds nothing to being except its own negation #expands (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 652
• The for-itself is fully responsible for its being yet cannot justify or choose it #complicates (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 343
• The for-itself is a relation to the world, not a separate entity #expands (0.72) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 831