The for-itself depends on the in-itself through an internal relation

Evidence

It remains for us to consider the second problem which we formulated in our Introduction: If the in-itself and the for-itself are two modalities of being, is there not an hiatus at the very core of the idea of being? And is its comprehension not severed into two incommunicable parts by the very fact that its extension is constituted by two radically heterogenous classes? What is there in common between the being which is what it is, and the being which is what it is not and which is not what it is? What can help us here, however, is the conclusion of our preceding inquiry. We have just shown in fact that the in-itself and the for-itself are not juxtaposed. Quite the contrary, the for-itself without the in-itself is a kind of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could exist without form or a sound without pitch and without timbre. A consciousness which would be consciousness of nothing would be an absolute nothing. But if consciousness is bound to the in-itself by an internal relation, doesn’t this mean that it is articulated with the in-itself so as to constitute a totality, and is it not this totality which would be given the name being or reality? — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1437

Categorization

• XREF: The internal relation binding for-itself to in-itself directly sets up Beauvoir’s account of freedom and facticity as inseparably bound. — connects to: The for-itself is defined as an internal negation of the in-itself, bridged through knowledge — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 37; The For-itself is process rather than entity; The in-itself and for-itself are two radically separated regions of being (+17 more)
• DEFINE: Clarifies that in-itself and for-itself are not merely juxtaposed but internally articulated into a totality.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1437

Broader Connections

• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571
• The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself #complicates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1432
• The in-itself has no need of the for-itself to be #qualifies (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1439
• The original relation between thises is external negation effected by the For-itself #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 600