Freedom is not self-founded but thrown, creating its own facticity

Evidence

We have established that the for-itself is free. But this does not mean that it is its own foundation. If to be free meant to be its own foundation, it would be necessary that freedom should decide the existence of its being. And this necessity can be understood in two ways. First, it would be necessary that freedom should decide its being-free; that is, not only that it should be a choice of an end, but that it should be a choice of itself as freedom. This would suppose therefore that the possibility of being-free and the possibility of not-being-free exist equally before the free choice of either one of them—i.e., before the free choice of freedom. But since then a previous freedom would be necessary which would choose to be free—i.e., basically, which would choose to be what it is already—we should be referred to infinity; for there would be need of another prior freedom in order to choose this and so on. In fact we are a freedom which chooses, but we do not choose to be free. We are condemned to freedom, as we said earlier, thrown into freedom or, as Heidegger says, “abandoned.” And we can see that this abandonment has no other origin than the very existence of freedom. If, therefore, freedom is defined as the escape from the given, from fact, then there is a fact of escape from fact. This is the facticity of freedom. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1156

Categorization

• DEFINE: Precisely defines the facticity of freedom: the for-itself is free but does not choose to be free, hence there is a fact of escaping fact.
• XREF: Directly sets up Beauvoir’s ethics, grounding freedom as a given condition rather than a self-created value. Also echoes Heidegger’s Geworfenheit (‘abandonment’). — connects to: Facticity is only ever graspable as already recovered and freely constructed — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 345; Past actions become irrevocable facts the for-itself cannot escape — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 495; Situation is the fused double determination of freedom and facticity — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 725 (+13 more)

Broader Connections

• Freedom is synonymous with the for-itself’s lack of being #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1328
• Freedom cannot choose its own past but must exist through it. #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1177
• Freedom chooses its being but cannot choose not to be #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1146
• Freedom is the for-itself’s permanent ability to nihilate its own being #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1075
• Beauvoir distinguishes inborn ontological freedom from willed freedom that facticity can eviscerate #qualifies (0.78) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 643
• Freedom and situation are mutually constituting rather than opposites #corroborates (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1164