My being-for-others is radically distinct from my being-for-myself

Evidence

Everything would be very simple if I belonged to a world whose meanings were revealed simply in the light of my own ends. In this case I would dispose of things as instruments or as instrumental complexes within the limits of my own choice of myself; it is this choice which would make of the mountain an obstacle difficult to overcome or a spot from which to get a good view of the landscape, etc; the problem would not be posed of knowing what meaning this mountain could have in itself since I would be the one by whom meanings come to reality in itself. … But we have seen that this monadic conception conceals a hidden solipsism precisely because it is going to confuse the plurality of meanings which I can attach to the real and the plurality of meaningful systems each one of which refers to a consciousness which I am not. Moreover on the level of concrete experience this monadic description is revealed as inadequate. There exists, in fact, something in “my” world other than a plurality of possible meanings; there exist objective meanings which are given to me as not having been brought to light by me. I, by whom meanings come to things, I find myself engaged in an already meaningful world which reflects to me meanings which I have not put into it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1207 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Being seen enslaves me to a freedom that is not my own — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 741; The look splits me into a for-itself and an unknowable being-for-others — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 742; The Other is the being through whom I can attain any objective self-knowledge — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 747 (+5 more)

Broader Connections