Shame, fear, and pride all recognize the Other as an unreachable subject.

Evidence

By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other. Yet this object which has appeared to the Other is not an empty image in the mind of another. Such an image in fact, would be imputable wholly to the Other and so could not “touch” me. I could feel irritation, or anger before it as before a bad portrait of myself which gives to my expression an ugliness or baseness which I do not have, but I could not be touched to the quick. Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 660 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Consider for example shame. Here we are dealing with a mode of consciousness which has a structure identical with all those which we have previously described. It is a non-positional self-consciousness, conscious (of) itself as shame; as such, it is an example of what the Germans call Erlebnis, and it is accessible to reflection. In addition its structure is intentional; it is a shameful apprehension of something and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am. Shame therefore realizes an intimate relation of myself to myself. Through shame I have discovered an aspect of my being. Yet although certain complex forms derived from shame can appear on the reflective plane, shame is not originally a phenomenon of reflection. In fact no matter what results one can obtain in solitude by the religious practice of shame, it is in its primary structure shame before somebody. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for-itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst, is incompatible with the reflective attitude; in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 659 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Shame is the recognition of being as the Other sees one — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 660; The Other-as-subject can in no way be known or conceived as such; Shame is fundamentally experienced in the presence of another person — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 659 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Shame is the recognition of being as the Other sees one #corroborates (0.92) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 660
• The Other-as-subject can in no way be known or conceived as such #corroborates (0.88)
• Shame is fundamentally experienced in the presence of another person #exemplifies (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 659
• Positing oneself as object before an absolute non-objective subject produces fear and alienation. #corroborates (0.84) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 786
• The Other is an invisible presence that supports shame without being an object #complicates (0.82)
• Shame arises from individual isolation and dissolves within collective action #contradicts (0.78) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 735
• Vanity requires others to despise, while pride rests on self alone #complicates (0.75) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 8290