Consciousness can disclose a being that is mine yet not for-me

Evidence

WE have described human reality from the standpoint of negating conduct and from the standpoint of the cogito. Following this lead we have discovered that human reality is-for-itself. Is this all that it is? Without going outside our attitude of reflective description, we can encounter modes of consciousness which seem, even while themselves remaining strictly in for-itself, to point to a radically different type of ontological structure. This ontological structure is mine; it is in relation to myself as subject that I am concerned about myself, and yet this concern (for-myself) reveals to me a being which is my being without being-for-me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 658

Categorization

• XREF: Sets up the pivotal distinction between for-itself and for-others (pour-autrui), the explicit groundwork for Beauvoir’s account of being-seen in The Second Sex. — connects to: The Other exists for consciousness as a prenumerical refused self; Consciousness never coincides with itself because it exists for a witness — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 329
• DEFINE: Introduces the key ontological problem the chapter will answer: a being that is mine while not being for-me — anticipating Being-for-Others.

Broader Connections

• The Other exists for consciousness as a prenumerical refused self #expands (0.85)
• Consciousness never coincides with itself because it exists for a witness #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 329