The For-itself is responsible for how it apprehends qualities of things

Evidence

This absolute determination, which is the determination of quality as a profile of the “this,” belongs to the freedom of the For-itself. It is not; it is as “to-be.” Anyone may see this for himself by considering how the revelation of one quality of the thing appears always as a factual gratuity grasped across a freedom. While I can not make this orange peel cease being green, it is I who am responsible for my apprehending it as a rough green or a green roughness. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 598

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes the For-itself’s freedom (how qualities are grasped) from the in-itself’s brute being (that the peel is green).
• XREF: Sets up the backdrop to Beauvoir: freedom as the apprehension of facticity through a chosen attitude. — connects to: The for-itself is fully responsible for its being yet cannot justify or choose it — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 343; The for-itself’s presence creates the very distinction between this and that — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 584; The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 571 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #expands (0.87) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• The for-itself is a relation to the world, not a separate entity #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 831
• The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1432
• The for-itself depends on the in-itself through an internal relation #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1437