Self-perception is impossible because the for-itself is contingency

Evidence

In order not to be a given, the for-itself must perpetually constitute itself as in withdrawal in relation to itself; that is, it must leave itself behind it as a datum which it already no longer is. This characteristic of the for-itself implies that it is the being which finds no help, no pillar of support in what it was. But on the other hand, the for-itself is free and can cause there to be a world because the for-itself is the being which has to he what it was in the light of what it will be. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1145 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Eventually, while looking at the ‘boiled leather’ of a chestnut tree in the local park and feeling the nausea again, Roquentin realises that it is not just the tree but the Being of the tree that is bothering him. It is the way in which, inexplicably and pointlessly, it simply sits there refusing to make sense or tone itself down. This is what contingency is: the random, outrageous thisness of things. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 336 (#expands, via linked claim)

If we wish to conceive of a synthetic organization such that the for-itself is inseparable from the in-itself and conversely such that the in-itself is indissolubly bound to the for-itself, we must conceive of this synthesis in such a way that the in-itself would receive its existence from the nihilation which caused there to be consciousness of it. What does this mean if not that the indissoluble totality of in-itself and for-itself is conceivable only in the form of a being which is its own “self-cause”? It is this being and no other which could be valid absolutely as that of which we spoke earlier. And if we can raise the question of the being of the for-itself articulated in the in-itself, it is because we define ourselves a priori by means of a pre-ontological comprehension of the ens causa sui. Of course this ens causa sui is impossible, and the concept of it, as we have seen, includes a contradiction. Nevertheless the fact remains that since we raise the question of the being of the by adopting the point of view of the ens causa sui, it is from this point of view that we must set about examining the credentials of this . Has it not appeared due to the mere fact of the upsurge of the for-itself, and is not the for-itself originally a project of being its own self-cause? Thus we begin to grasp the nature of total reality. … Everything happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing only a missing God. Everything happens therefore as if the in-itself and the for-itself were presented in a state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis. Not that the integration has ever taken place but on the contrary precisely because it is always indicated and always impossible. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1440 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The cogito’s self-apprehension is first a grasp of its own contingency.; Access to another’s being requires their self-knowledge, which is impossible; Contingency is the inexplicable, pointless thisness of things — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 336 (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Contingency is the inexplicable, pointless thisness of things #expands (0.85) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 336
• The for-itself is defined by self-withdrawal rather than self-identity #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1145
• Human reality is an abortive project toward being its own self-cause #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1440