The in-itself and for-itself are two radically separated regions of being

Evidence

Concerning the For-itself as such we should never say, “It is” in the sense that we say, for example, “It is nine o’clock;” that is, in the sense of the total equivalence of being with itself which posits and suppresses the self and which gives the external aspect of passivity. For the For-itself has the existence of an appearance coupled with a witness of a reflection which refers to a reflecting without there being any object of which the reflection would be the reflection. The For-itself does not have being because its being is always at a distance: its being is there in the reflecting, if you consider appearance, which is appearance or reflection only for the reflecting; it is there in the reflection if you consider the reflecting, which is no longer in itself anything more than a pure function of reflecting this reflection. Furthermore in itself the For-itself is not being, for it makes itself be explicitly for-itself as not being being. It is consciousness of —— as the internal negation of ——. The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the internal relation of the For-itself to the thing. The For-itself constitutes itself outside in terms of the thing as the negation of that thing; thus its first relation with being-in-itself is negation. It “is” in the mode of the For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it reveals itself as not being being. It doubly escapes being, by an internal disintegration and by express negation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Our research has enabled us to answer the first of these questions: the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic connection which is nothing other than the For-itself itself. The For-itself, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the In-itself; it is like a hole of being at the heart of Being. … The for-itself has no reality save that of being the nihilation of being. Its sole qualification comes to it from the fact that it is the nihilation of an individual and particular In-itself and not of a being in general. The For-itself is not nothingness in general but a particular privation; it constitutes itself as the privation of this being. Therefore we have no business asking about the way in which the for-itself can be united with the in-itself since the for-itself is in no way an autonomous substance. As a nihilation it is made-to-be by the in-itself; as an internal negation it must by means of the in-itself make known to itself what it is not and consequently what it has to be. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1432 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

It remains for us to consider the second problem which we formulated in our Introduction: If the in-itself and the for-itself are two modalities of being, is there not an hiatus at the very core of the idea of being? And is its comprehension not severed into two incommunicable parts by the very fact that its extension is constituted by two radically heterogenous classes? What is there in common between the being which is what it is, and the being which is what it is not and which is not what it is? What can help us here, however, is the conclusion of our preceding inquiry. We have just shown in fact that the in-itself and the for-itself are not juxtaposed. Quite the contrary, the for-itself without the in-itself is a kind of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could exist without form or a sound without pitch and without timbre. A consciousness which would be consciousness of nothing would be an absolute nothing. But if consciousness is bound to the in-itself by an internal relation, doesn’t this mean that it is articulated with the in-itself so as to constitute a totality, and is it not this totality which would be given the name being or reality? — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1437 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Being-in-itself is so full of itself it cannot reflect or affirm. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 162; The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 445; The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1432 (+12 more)

Broader Connections

• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #corroborates (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1432
• The for-itself depends on the in-itself through an internal relation #qualifies (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1437
• Sartre divides being into free for-itself consciousness and inert in-itself matter #expands (0.85) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 496
• The for-itself’s presence creates the very distinction between this and that #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 584
• The for-itself is simultaneously nihilation and, via the Other, a thing #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1046
• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571
• The for-itself is a relation to the world, not a separate entity #qualifies (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 831