The Disease is constituted as an object belonging to others, not to me

Evidence

At this point a new layer of existence appears: we have surpassed the lived pain toward the suffered illness; now we surpass the illness toward the Disease. The Disease as psychic is of course very different from the disease known and described by the physician; it is a state. There is no question here of bacteria or of lesions in tissue, but of a synthetic form of destruction. This form on principle escapes me; at times it is revealed to the Other by the “twinges” of pain, by the “crises” of my Illness, but the rest of the time it remains out of reach without disappearing. It is then objectively discernible for Others. Others have informed me of it, Others can diagnose it; it is present for Others even though I am not conscious of it. Its true nature is therefore a pure and simple being-for-others. When I am not suffering, I speak of it, I conduct myself with respect to it as with respect to an object which on principle is out of reach, for which others are the depositories. If I have hepatitis, I avoid drinking wine so as not to arouse pains in my liver. But my precise goal—not to arouse pains in my liver—is in no way distinct from that other goal—to obey the prohibitions of the physician who revealed the pain to me. Thus another is responsible for my disease. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 920 (#expands, via linked claim)

Everything would be very simple if I belonged to a world whose meanings were revealed simply in the light of my own ends. In this case I would dispose of things as instruments or as instrumental complexes within the limits of my own choice of myself; it is this choice which would make of the mountain an obstacle difficult to overcome or a spot from which to get a good view of the landscape, etc; the problem would not be posed of knowing what meaning this mountain could have in itself since I would be the one by whom meanings come to reality in itself. … But we have seen that this monadic conception conceals a hidden solipsism precisely because it is going to confuse the plurality of meanings which I can attach to the real and the plurality of meaningful systems each one of which refers to a consciousness which I am not. Moreover on the level of concrete experience this monadic description is revealed as inadequate. There exists, in fact, something in “my” world other than a plurality of possible meanings; there exist objective meanings which are given to me as not having been brought to light by me. I, by whom meanings come to things, I find myself engaged in an already meaningful world which reflects to me meanings which I have not put into it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1207 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Every situation exists in the world; it is not of the same order as being. It is, in fact, essentially constituted out of Others; its objectivity is conditioned by the meaning that other subjectivities cast on being. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Illness makes the lived body appear as an object, a given substance.; The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 444; Illness as a psychic state exists primarily as being-for-others — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 920 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Illness as a psychic state exists primarily as being-for-others #expands (0.92) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 920
• Others’ meanings present themselves to me as objective, not as my own choices #corroborates (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1207
• The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself #expands (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444