Shame is fundamentally experienced in the presence of another person
Evidence
Consider for example shame. Here we are dealing with a mode of consciousness which has a structure identical with all those which we have previously described. It is a non-positional self-consciousness, conscious (of) itself as shame; as such, it is an example of what the Germans call Erlebnis, and it is accessible to reflection. In addition its structure is intentional; it is a shameful apprehension of something and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am. Shame therefore realizes an intimate relation of myself to myself. Through shame I have discovered an aspect of my being. Yet although certain complex forms derived from shame can appear on the reflective plane, shame is not originally a phenomenon of reflection. In fact no matter what results one can obtain in solitude by the religious practice of shame, it is in its primary structure shame before somebody. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for-itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst, is incompatible with the reflective attitude; in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 659
Categorization
- XREF: Directly anticipates Beauvoir’s analysis of how woman’s being is constituted by the male gaze, and echoes Sartre’s own later elaboration of the Look in this same chapter. — connects to: Being objectified by another’s look constitutes an inescapable existential guilt — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 72; Shame is the recognition of being as the Other sees one — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 660; Shame precedes reflection and arises from an opaque self-relation (+10 more)
- DEFINE: Grounds the definition of Being-for-Others in the concrete phenomenon of shame rather than abstract speculation.
- BMF: The gesture ‘clings to me’ as I live it and only becomes shameful at the instant the Other’s gaze lands on it strongly evokes Jane Eyre’s recurrent scenes where Rochester’s gaze fixes and objectifies Jane, constituting her self-relation through his seeing.
Broader Connections
- Shame is the recognition of being as the Other sees one
#corroborates(0.93) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 660 - The Other is an invisible presence that supports shame without being an object
#corroborates(0.88) - Being perceived as an object by another creates communal shame and alienation
#corroborates(0.85) - Shame first reveals one’s factical body because the Other’s look falls on embodiment
#expands(0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 97 - Shame precedes reflection and arises from an opaque self-relation
#expands(0.82) - Erroneous perception of a look could render shame a false shame before nobody.
#qualifies(0.80) - Shame at nakedness symbolizes the human condition of being seen as an object.
#expands(0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 784 - Shame claims the Other’s freedom as one’s own, affirming a unity of being.
#expands(0.72)