The fundamental relation between consciousnesses is conflict, not solidarity

Evidence

It appears therefore that the experience of the “We” and the “Us” although real, is not of a nature to modify the results of our prior investigations. As for the Us-object, this is directly dependent on the Third—i.e., on my being-for-others—and it is constituted on the foundation of my being-outside-for-others. And as for the We-subject, this is a psychological experience which supposes one way or another that the Other’s existence as such has been already revealed to us. It is therefore useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein; it is conflict. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1044

Categorization

• XREF: This directly sets up Beauvoir’s engagement with Sartre: her The Second Sex dialectically reworks the conflict-driven Mitsein toward reciprocity. Also echoes the master-slave struggle in Hegel’s Phenomenology. — connects to: Heidegger’s being-with is primordial co-existence, not interpersonal confrontation.
• DEFINE: Clarifies the crucial distinction between the We-subject (a merely subjective Erlebnis) and the Us-object (constituted by the Third), showing why neither escapes the for-itself/for-others structure.