A viable theory of the Other must rest on internal negation, not on God.

Evidence

It seems therefore that a positive theory of the Other’s existence must be able simultaneously to avoid solipsism and to dispense with a recourse to God if it envisages my original relation to the Other as an internal negation; that is, as a negation which posits the original distinction between the Other and myself as being such that it determines me by means of the Other and determines the Other by means of me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 678

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines internal negation as the reciprocal determination of self and Other.
• XREF: connects to: Being-for-others requires an internal negation, not an external or in-itself one.; External negation leaves beings untouched while internal negation constitutes them.; The Other’s mutual negation is required for being-for-others, not merely my own (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Being-for-others requires an internal negation, not an external or in-itself one. #corroborates (0.95)
• External negation leaves beings untouched while internal negation constitutes them. #expands (0.85)
• The Other is constituted by negation as the self which is not myself #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 675
• The Other’s mutual negation is required for being-for-others, not merely my own #expands (0.80)
• External negations leave beings untouched while internal negations constitute the self #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 573
• Thinking the negation of negation requires passing through the death of God #complicates (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 156