Sensory qualities already carry moral meaning and are not later enriched by projection.
Evidence
The explanation by projection, which is found in such trite sayings as “A landscape is a spiritual state,” always begs the question. Take for example that particular quality which we call “slimy.” Certainly for the European adult it signifies a host of human and moral characteristics which can easily be reduced to relations of being. A handshake, a smile, a thought, a feeling can be slimy. The common opinion is that first I have experienced certain behavior and certain moral attitudes which displease me and which I condemn, and that in addition I have a sensory intuition of “slimy.” Afterwards, says the theory, I should establish a connection between these feelings and sliminess and the slimy would function as a symbol of a whole class of human feelings and attitudes. I would then have enriched the slimy by projecting upon it my knowledge with respect to that human category of behavior. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1395
Categorization
- DEFINE: Clarifies the rejection of the ‘projection’ theory: qualities like sliminess are not neutral sensations onto which moral meaning is later projected; the meaning is already in the quality itself.
- XREF: Links to Sartre’s theory of affective qualities (the ‘adumbration’ of being) and to later phenomenology of value in Merleau-Ponty and the Frankfurt School. — connects to: Perceived qualities exist objectively as the thing itself, not as subjective effects — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 594; Senses are not subjective channels but objective rules of worldly revelation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 856
Broader Connections
- Perceived qualities exist objectively as the thing itself, not as subjective effects
#corroborates(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 594 - Senses are not subjective channels but objective rules of worldly revelation.
#expands(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 856