The certainty of being looked-at is only ever probable, not guaranteed.

Evidence

In particular there is the fact that through shame we confer on the Other an indubitable presence. Now as we have seen, it is only probable that the Other is looking at me. That farm at the top of the hill seems to be looking at the commandos, and it is certain that the house is occupied by the enemy. But it is not certain that the enemy soldiers are at present watching through the windows. It is not certain that the man whose footstep I hear behind me is looking at me; his face could be turned away, his look fixed on the ground or on a book. Finally in general it is not sure that those eyes which are fixed on me are eyes; they could be only “artificial ones” resembling real eyes. In short must we not say that in turn the look becomes probable because of the fact that I can constantly believe that I am looked-at without actually being so? As a result does not our certainty of the Other’s existence take on a purely hypothetical character? — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 759

Categorization

• QUESTION: Sartre raises the probabilistic underpinning of the Other’s look; his resolution in the next passage is worth tracking as the systematic answer.
• XREF: connects to: The Other cannot be known as an object because objects are only ever probable — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 711; The look holds certainty that cannot transfer to the Other as object. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 761

Broader Connections

• The look holds certainty that cannot transfer to the Other as object. #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 761
• The Other cannot be known as an object because objects are only ever probable #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 711