Explaining desires by genus classification assumes the abstract precedes the concrete
Evidence
It is obvious that this so-called explanatory classification has no more value or interest than the classifications in ancient botany; like the latter it amounts to assuming the priority of the abstract over the concrete—as if the fondness for play existed first in general to be subsequently made specific by the action of these circumstances in the love of sport, the latter in the fondness for rowing, and finally the rowing in the desire to row on a particular stream, under certain circumstances in a particular season—and like the ancient classifications it fails to explain the concrete enrichment which at each stage is undergone by the abstract inclination considered. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1324
Categorization
- XREF: Parallels the nominalism/realism debates in medieval philosophy and Comte’s materialism critique. — connects to: People categorize things by similarity to prototypes rather than by shared defining features — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, 201; Humans infer unseen traits of new species from essentialized hierarchical categories. — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 267; Substitutable causes in set-theoretic analysis resolve into a more abstract shared concept. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, 1761
- DEFINE: Illuminates how Sartre’s anti-reductionism shapes his existential psychoanalysis against generic classification.
- yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: People categorize things by similarity to prototypes rather than by shared defining features — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, 201; Humans infer unseen traits of new species from essentialized hierarchical categories. — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 267; Substitutable causes in set-theoretic analysis resolve into a more abstract shared concept. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, 1761
Broader Connections
- People categorize things by similarity to prototypes rather than by shared defining features
#complicates(0.78) — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 201