Having a place requires not being wholly absorbed in that place

Evidence

Yet on the other hand, this place which I am is a relation. A univocal relation, to be sure, but a relation all the same. If I am limited to existing my place, I can not at the same time be elsewhere in order to establish this fundamental relation; I can not have even a dim comprehension of the object in relation to which my place is defined. I can only exist the inward determinations which the inapprehensible and unthinkable objects which surround me without my knowing it can provoke in me. By the same token the very reality of absolute extension disappears, and I am separated from everything which resembles a place. Furthermore I am neither free nor not-free; I am a pure existent without constraint, but without any way either of denying the constraint. In order that such a thing as an extension originally defined as my place may come into the world and by the same stroke strictly define me, it is not merely necessary that I exist my place—i.e., that I have to be there. It is necessary as well that I be able to be not wholly here so that I can be over there, near the object which I locate at ten feet from me and from the standpoint of which I make my place known to myself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1169

Categorization

• DEFINE: This is the core definitional move: ‘my place’ as a univocal relation requiring a dual standpoint of existing and transcending.
• XREF: Directly sets up Beauvoir’s notion that situated freedom requires a subtraction from pure immanence; also echoes Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein. — connects to: Passing through a place means simultaneously being there and not being there — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 640; An end must be both accessible and separated from us by real existents — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1153; Being present in a place does not let one realize being that place — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1236 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Being present in a place does not let one realize being that place #corroborates (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1236
• Habit abolishes the partition between interior and exterior #complicates (0.78) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 573
• Doing nothing is disengagement from attention economy plus reengagement with place #exemplifies (0.75)
• The for-itself is originally dispersed outside itself and must seek its being elsewhere #expands (0.72)
• Worldliness differs by mode of living, not by location in the world #expands (0.72)
• Subjectivity cannot reside in its own being but haunts itself #expands (0.72) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 374