The Other relates to self through reciprocal internal negation, forming a detotalized totality

Evidence

The Other must appear to the cogito as not being me. This negation can be conceived in two ways: either it is a pure, external negation, and it will separate the Other from myself as one substance from another substance—and in this case all apprehension of the Other is by definition impossible; or else it will be an internal negation, which means a synthetic, active connection of the two terms, each one of which constitutes itself by denying that it is the other. This negative relation will therefore be reciprocal and will possess a two fold interiority: This means first that the multiplicity of “Others” will not be a collection but a totality (in this sense we admit that Hegel is right) since each Other finds his being in the Other. It also means that this Totality is such that it is on principle impossible for us to adopt “the point of view of the whole.” In fact we have seen that no abstract concept of consciousness can result from the comparison of my being-for-myself with my object-state for the Other. Furthermore this totality—like that of the For-itself—is a detotalized totality; for since existence-for-others is a radical refusal of the Other, no totalitarian and unifying synthesis of “Others” is possible. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 712

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the internal negation binding self and Other, and the detotalized totality of Others — key technical machinery for the social ontology.
• XREF: The detotalized totality of Others deepens the earlier analysis of the For-itself’s own detotalized totality; also the critique of adopting the ‘point of view of the whole’ prefigures Beauvoir’s rejection of a totalizing ethical standpoint. — connects to: The self flees each negation toward a complementary negation whose fusion reveals the in-itself; The Other is constituted by negation as the self which is not myself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 675; The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 445 (+5 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The internal-negation structure — each self constituting itself by denying it is the Other, yet thereby forming a reciprocal totality one can never survey from outside — is dense enough to reward rereading across the whole social ontology.

Broader Connections

• The for-others requires a totality in which selfness and the Other are reciprocal structures #expands (0.90)
• The negation relation with the Other is reciprocal unlike that with things #expands (0.90)
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• The totality of for-itself and in-itself differs from for-others by its absence of reciprocity #complicates (0.85)
• External negations leave beings untouched while internal negations constitute the self #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 573
• Totality of being arises only through the detotalized for-itself #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 585