The Other escapes phenomenological reduction and is not in the world

Evidence

The phenomenological reduction must result in removing from consideration the object of shame in order better to make shame itself stand out in its absolute subjectivity. But the Other is not the object of the shame; the object is my act or my situation in the world. They alone can be strictly “reduced.” The Other is not even an objective condition of my shame. Yet he is as the very-being of it. Shame is the revelation of the Other not in the way in which a consciousness reveals an object but in the way in which one moment of consciousness implies on the side another moment as its motivation. If we should have attained pure consciousness by means of the cogito, and if this pure consciousness were only a consciousness (of being) shame, the Other’s consciousness would still haunt it as an inapprehensible presence and would thereby escape all reduction. This demonstrates sufficiently that it is not in the world that the Other is first to be sought but at the side of consciousness as a consciousness in which and by which consciousness makes itself be what it is. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 752

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains how the Other stands to consciousness: as an inapprehensible presence, not as a reducible object — a key ontological distinction.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Beauvoir backdrop — the Other as co-constitutive of consciousness is central to her feminist ethics. — connects to: The Other’s worldly presence is not analytically derivable from its transcendent subjectivity. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 764; The Other’s presence resists phenomenological reduction and doubt — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 750; Absence is not given by objects but posited by a consciousness that negates
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The Other’s worldly presence is not analytically derivable from its transcendent subjectivity. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 764; The Other’s presence resists phenomenological reduction and doubt — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 750; Absence is not given by objects but posited by a consciousness that negates

Broader Connections

• The Other’s presence resists phenomenological reduction and doubt #corroborates (0.95) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 750
• Absence is not given by objects but posited by a consciousness that negates #expands (0.72)