The voluntary act requires reflective consciousness, while involuntary spontaneity remains purely unreflective

Evidence

Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification. I am a pure consciousness of things, and things, caught up in the circuit of my selfness, offer to me their potentialities as the proof of my non-thetic consciousness (of) my own possibilities. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 724 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: In absorbed action there is no self inhabiting consciousness to qualify the acts — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 724; An act must be self-present as operative intention to unify consciousness; Acts can seem intentional yet lack conscious reason at the moment (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• In absorbed action there is no self inhabiting consciousness to qualify the acts #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 724
• An act must be self-present as operative intention to unify consciousness #expands (0.80)
• Acts can seem intentional yet lack conscious reason at the moment #qualifies (0.78)
• Denying conscious control is itself a moral position of nonaccountability #expands (0.72) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 315