Motion is the least-being that never fully is

Evidence

If we try to clarify our objections to Zeno’s arguments, we establish that they originate in a certain naive conception of motion. We admit that the arrow “passes” at AB, but it does not seem to us that to pass a place is the equivalent of remaining there—i.e., of being there. Yet in this view we are guilty of serious confusion, for we consider that the moving object only passes AB (i.e., it never is there) and at the same time we continue to take for granted that in itself it is. Consequently the arrow simultaneously would be in itself and would not be at AB. This is the origin of the Eleatic Paradox: how could the arrow not be at AB since at AB it is? In other words in order to avoid the Eleatic paradox we must renounce the generally admitted postulate according to which being in motion preserves its being-in-itself. Merely to pass at AB is a being-of-passage. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 640 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Treating motion as an accident of being makes rest and motion indistinguishable — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 639; Motion cannot be understood while preserving the in-itself’s static identity — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 640; Motion resists ontological derivation and must be accepted as a contingent fact (+3 more)

Broader Connections