Consciousness defines itself by internal negation of its own objects

Evidence

Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof. … Not only does pure subjectivity, if initially given, fail to transcend itself to posit the objective; a “pure” subjectivity disappears. What can properly be called subjectivity is consciousness (of) consciousness. But this consciousness (of being) consciousness must be qualified in some way, and it can be qualified only as revealing intuition or it is nothing. Now a revealing intuition implies something revealed. Absolute subjectivity can be established only in the face of something revealed; immanence can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendent. … It is not a question of showing that the phenomena of inner sense imply the existence of objective spatial phenomena, but that consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being. … To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 151 (#expands, via linked claim)

But we must define more precisely what we understand by this original negation. Actually we should distinguish two types of negation: external negation and internal negation. The first appears as a purely external bond established between two beings by a witness. When I say, for example, “A cup is not an inkwell,” it is very evident that the foundation of this negation is neither in the cup nor in the inkwell. Both of these objects are what they are, and that is all. The negation stands as a categorical and ideal connection which I establish between them without modifying them in any way whatsoever, without enriching them or impoverishing them with the slightest quality; they are not even ever so slightly grazed by this negative synthesis. As it serves neither to enrich them nor to constitute them, it remains strictly external. But we can already guess the meaning of the other type of negation if we consider such expressions as “I am not rich” or “I am not handsome.” Pronounced with a certain melancholy, they do not mean only that the speaker is denied a certain quality but that the denial itself comes to influence the inner structure of the positive being who has been denied the quality. When I say, “I am not handsome,” I do not limit myself to denying with respect to myself taken as wholly concrete, a certain virtue which due to this fact passes into nothingness while I keep intact the positive totality of my being (as when I say, “The vase is not white, it is gray”—“The inkwell is not on the table, it is on the mantelpiece”). I intend to indicate that “not being handsome” is a certain negative virtue of my being. It characterizes me within; as negative it is a real quality of myself—that of not being handsome—and this negative quality will explain my melancholy as well as, for example, my failures in the world. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 573 (#expands, via linked claim)

THE human being is not only the being by whom négatités are disclosed in the world; he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself. In our Introduction we defined consciousness as “a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.” But now that we have examined the meaning of “the question,” we can at present also write the formula thus: “Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being.” — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 277 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Consciousness is necessarily directed at a being other than itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 151; External negations leave beings untouched while internal negations constitute the self — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 573; Consciousness is a being that is conscious of the nothingness of its own being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 277 (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Consciousness is necessarily directed at a being other than itself #expands (0.95) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 151
• External negations leave beings untouched while internal negations constitute the self #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 573
• Consciousness is a being that is conscious of the nothingness of its own being. #complicates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 277
• Consciousness is necessarily consciousness of something, always self-consciousness through its object #expands (0.80)
• Consciousness of self is identical with consciousness of the object, not a separate act #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 134