Character and temperament differ only by the project of interpretation, not by substance.

Evidence

Similarly what we call a person’s temperament or character but which is nothing but his free project in so far as it is-for-the-Other, appears also for the For-itself as an invariable unrealizable. Alain has perceived correctly that character is a vow. When a man says, “I am not easy to please,” he is entering into a free engagement with his ill-temper, and by the same token his words are a free interpretation of certain ambiguous details in his past. In this sense there is no character; there is only a project of oneself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1284 (#expands, via linked claim)

Between the three moments of absolute spirit – art, religion and philosophy – the difference is not of content but of form, and this has two consequences. First, the spiritual in-formation, the labour in which speculative content gives itself its form, does not have the same nature or the same outcome in all three moments. To this extent, as a second consequence, the relationship enjoyed by spirit or by individual consciousness to these modalities of ‘in-formation’ is no longer uniform, and in its turn is differentiated into figuration, representation, and conceptual thought. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 944 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Character is not a fixed trait but a freely chosen project the self maintains. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1284; Art, religion, and philosophy differ only in form, not content — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 944; Character is only revealed through resistance against external constraints

Broader Connections