For Sartre, the For-itself is constituted by desire, so annihilating desire destroys consciousness itself.

Evidence

If compared with Epicurus, on the other hand, Sartre’s position is seen to be definitely opposed to a philosophy which advocated the repression of all but the most moderate desires. Ataraxia is about as far removed from the existentialist ideal of passionate commitment as one can get. The divergency becomes still more apparent if we compare Sartre’s view with that of certain Eastern philosophies which identify desire with suffering and advocate the total annihilation of desire as a means of salvation. Here there are two important disagreements. In the first place, with Sartre, to destroy all desire would be to destroy the For-itself—not in the nothingness of Nirvana but absolutely. A satisfied For-itself would no longer be a For-itself. The For-itself is desire; that is, it is the nihilating project toward a Being which it can never have or be but which as an end gives the For-itself its meaning. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 59

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the For-itself as a nihilation project toward an unattainable Being, tying desire to the very structure of consciousness.
  • XREF: Connects directly to foundational ontology — the For-itself’s lack of being that constitutes its desire, groundwork for Beauvoir’s ethics. — connects to: Sartre divides being into free for-itself consciousness and inert in-itself matter — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,…, 496; Desire’s failure to reach incarnation can flip consciousness into masochistic submission; Desire strips the world of meaning to reduce self and Other to pure facticity. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 985 (+4 more)

Broader Connections