The Other cannot be known as an object because objects are only ever probable

Evidence

What the cogito must reveal to us is not the-Other-as-object. For a long time now it must have been obvious that what is called an object is said to be probable. If the Other is an object for me, he refers me to probability. But probability is founded solely on the infinite congruity of our representations. Since the Other is neither a representation nor a system of representations nor a necessary unity of our representations, he can not be probable: he can not at first be an object. Therefore if he is for us, this can be neither as a constitutive factor of our knowledge of the world nor as a constitutive factor of our knowledge of the self, but as one who “interests” our being, and that not as he contributes a priori to constitute our being but as he interests it concretely and “ontically” in the empirical circumstances of our facticity. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 711

Categorization

• DEFINE: Sharply distinguishes the Other (indubitable, via cogito) from objects (probable, via congruent representations) — a core ontological distinction.
• XREF: This object/probability distinction connects to the earlier epistemology chapter and anticipates the look-theft passages; also parallel to Heidegger’s ready-to-hand vs present-at-hand distinction. — connects to: The Other-as-subject can in no way be known or conceived as such; The Other’s existence is certain while the Other’s identity as this object never is.; The Other’s existence is disclosed, not abstractly proven (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• The Other-as-subject can in no way be known or conceived as such #corroborates (0.90)
• The Other’s existence is certain while the Other’s identity as this object never is. #expands (0.85)
• The Other’s existence is disclosed, not abstractly proven #corroborates (0.75)