The Other cannot coherently organize my experience given the structure of experience itself

Evidence

These phenomena, unlike all others, do not refer to possible experiences but to experiences which on principle are outside my experience and belong to a system which is inaccessible to me. But on the other hand, the condition of possibility for all experience is that the subject organize his impressions into a connected system. Thus we find in things “only what we have put into them.” The Other therefore can not without contradiction appear to us as organizing our experience; there would be in this an over-determination of the phenomenon. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 668

Categorization

  • DEFINE: The internal contradiction motivating Sartre’s own solution: how does an empirically-given, transcendent Other escape the solipsism this argument threatens?
  • XREF: connects to: The Other’s inner experiences are constitutively inaccessible to my perception yet organize my field; Causality cannot serve as a bridge between two radically separated experiences — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 669; The Other grounds my objectivity rather than being inferred by analogy from myself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 756 (+5 more)
  • yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The Other’s inner experiences are constitutively inaccessible to my perception yet organize my field; Causality cannot serve as a bridge between two radically separated experiences — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 669; The Other grounds my objectivity rather than being inferred by analogy from myself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 756 (+5 more)

Broader Connections