The We-subject experience is unstable and carries no metaphysical weight

Evidence

These few remarks do not claim to exhaust the question of the “We.” They aim only at indicating that the experience of the We-subject has no value as a metaphysical revelation; it depends strictly on the various forms of the for-others and is only an empirical enrichment of certain of these forms. It is to this fact evidently that we should attribute the extreme instability of this experience. It comes and disappears capriciously, leaving us in the face of others-as-objects or else of a “They” who look at us. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1041

Categorization

• DEFINE: Establishes that the We-subject is an empirical enrichment of for-others forms, not a metaphysical revelation.
• XREF: connects to: The We-subject experience is psychological, not ontological, and never truly unifies for-itselfs. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1034; The We-subject experience is a subjective psychological event, not an ontological relation — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1035; A unified human We-subject is impossible; conflict grounds being-for-others — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1041 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• A unified human We-subject is impossible; conflict grounds being-for-others #corroborates (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1041
• Sincerity is impossible because consciousness’s structure prevents being what one is #exemplifies (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 305
• Modernity consists in the destabilization of the subject, not mere progress #corroborates (0.72)