Coenesthesia is the affective, non-thetic texture of consciousness that projects surpass

Evidence

There exist therefore pure affective qualities which are surpassed and transcended by affective projects. We shall not make of them as Scheler did, some kind of “hyle” borne upon the flux of consciousness. For us it is simply a matter of the way in which consciousness exists its contingency; it is the very texture of consciousness in so far as it surpasses this texture toward its own possibilities; it is the manner in which consciousness exists spontaneously and in the non-thetic mode, that which it constitutes thetically but implicitly as a point of view on the world. This can be pure grief, but it can also be a mood, an affective, non-thetic tonality, the pure agreeable, the pure disagreeable. In a general way, it is what is called coenesthesia. This “coenesthesia” rarely appears without being surpassed toward the world by a transcendent project on the part of the For-itself; as such it can only with difficulty be studied in isolation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 876

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines coenesthesia as the non-thetic affective texture of consciousness, contrasting Sartre’s account with Scheler’s hyle.
• XREF: Core systematic backdrop for Beauvoir: the pre-reflective yet world-shaped affective tonality anticipates how embodiment becomes a situation. — connects to: The body is apprehended non-thetically as fatigue while consciousness attends to the world; Intentional affectivity directed at pain differs from pure body-consciousness; Consciousness and its affect are one indivisible being, not substance plus quality — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 136 (+1 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: how does non-thetic coenesthesia, as the ‘texture’ of consciousness, ground the transition to the body’s being-for-itself?

Broader Connections

• Affectivity is inseparable from materiality in Sartrean perception #expands (0.82) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 358
• The body is apprehended non-thetically as fatigue while consciousness attends to the world #corroborates (0.80)
• Intentional affectivity directed at pain differs from pure body-consciousness #expands (0.75)
• Consciousness and its affect are one indivisible being, not substance plus quality #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 136