The for-itself radically excludes all objectivity by its own mode of being

Evidence

But if it is true that the connection between a consciousness and life does not distort the nature of the “abstract moment of self-consciousness” which remains there, immersed, always capable of being discovered, is the case the same for objectivity? In other words, since we know that a consciousness is before being known, then is not a known consciousness wholly modified by the very fact that it is known? Is “to appear as an object for a consciousness” still “to be consciousness”? It is easy to reply to this question: the very being of self-consciousness is such that in its being, its being is in question; this means that it is pure interiority. It is perpetually a reference to a self which it has to be. Its being is defined by this: that it is this being in the mode of being what it is not and of not being what it is. Its being, therefore, is the radical exclusion of all objectivity. I am the one who can not be an object for myself, the one who can not even conceive for myself of existence in the form of an object (save on the plane of the reflective dissociation—but we have seen that reflection is the drama of the being who can not be an object for himself). This is not because of the lack of detachment or because of an intellectual prejudice or of a limit imposed on my knowledge, but because objectivity demands an explicit negation: the object is what I make myself not-be whereas I myself am what I make myself be. I pursue myself everywhere, I can not escape myself, I reapprehend myself from behind. Even if I could attempt to make myself an object, I would already be myself at the heart of that object which I am; and at the very center of that object I should have to be the subject who is looking at it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 694

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines why consciousness cannot be an object for itself: objectivity requires an explicit negation that the for-itself cannot perform on its own being.
• XREF: Connects to Sartre’s own distinction in this book between being-in-itself and being-for-itself, and to the earlier discussion of reflection as ‘the drama of the being who cannot be an object for himself.’ Also resonates with Hegel’s ‘I am I’ formulation being critiqued here. — connects to: The For-itself derives all its powers precisely from not being Being; Things resist all relational designations humanity tries to impose on them.; A quality’s being is radically distinct from the for-itself’s mode (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• The in-itself and for-itself are two radically separated regions of being #corroborates (0.85)