Conceiving consciousness as in-itself makes past and present unreconnectable

Evidence

Whatever may be their concept of consciousness, they have conferred on it the existence of the in-itself; they have considered it as being what it is. There is no reason to wonder afterwards that they fail to reconnect the past to the present, for the present thus conceived will reject the past with all its strength. … That “myness” of which Claparède speaks is not a subjective nuance which comes to shatter the memory; it is an ontological relation which unites the past to the present. My past never appears isolated in its “pastness;” it would be absurd even to imagine that it can exist as such. It is originally the past of this present. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 415

Categorization

• XREF: Directly maps onto Beauvoir’s premise that the for-itself, not the in-itself, is the being whose past is its own — foundational backdrop for her account of temporality and freedom. — connects to: The In-itself’s full being makes the emergence of consciousness inexplicable — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 70; Nothing separates past and present consciousness, yet that nothing is impassable; Maximum self-consciousness only reveals thought’s irrecoverable unconsciousness (+4 more)
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The In-itself’s full being makes the emergence of consciousness inexplicable — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 70; Nothing separates past and present consciousness, yet that nothing is impassable; Maximum self-consciousness only reveals thought’s irrecoverable unconsciousness (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Maximum self-consciousness only reveals thought’s irrecoverable unconsciousness #corroborates (0.80)