Ontology is descriptive while metaphysics is hypothetical and concerns origins

Evidence

In this sense ontology appears to us capable of being defined as the specification of the structures of being of the existent taken as a totality, and we shall define metaphysics rather as raising the question of the existence of the existent. This is why in view of the absolute contingency of the existent, we are convinced that any metaphysics must conclude with a “that is”—i.e., in a direct intuition of that contingency. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 799 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

But this immediately gives rise to a metaphysical interrogation. The upsurge of the for-itself starting from the in-itself is in no way comparable to the dialectical genesis of the Platonic Other starting from being. “Being” and “other” are, for Plato, genera. But we, on the contrary, have seen that being is an individual venture. Similarly the appearance of the for-itself is the absolute event which comes to being. There is therefore room here for a metaphysical problem which could be formulated thus: Why does the for-itself arise in terms of being? We, indeed, apply the term “metaphysical” to the study of individual processes which have given birth to this world as a concrete and particular totality. In this sense metaphysics is to ontology as history is to sociology. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1434 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Ontology specifies structures of being while metaphysics questions the existence of the existent — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 799; Metaphysics studies individual world-genesis where ontology studies universal structures — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1434; Ontology describes the conditions under which a world and human reality exist (+2 more)

Broader Connections