The person is defined as a free relation to oneself
Evidence
A Jew is not a Jew first in order to be subsequently ashamed or proud; it is his pride of being a Jew, his shame, or his indifference which will reveal to him his being-a-Jew; and this being-a-Jew is nothing outside the free manner of adopting it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1238 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Persons are understood as free unifications of responsibility rather than as substances; A person can be defined by the structure of their relations to the dead — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1262; Others constitute the situation that gives individual freedom its concrete content — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 453 (+5 more)
Broader Connections
- Freedom constitutes my being rather than attaching to it as a property
#corroborates(0.90) - Social identity is constituted by one’s free manner of adopting it.
#expands(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1238 - Persons are understood as free unifications of responsibility rather than as substances
#corroborates(0.82) - Others constitute the situation that gives individual freedom its concrete content
#expands(0.78) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 453 - In African thought a person is fundamentally a relation, not an individual
#complicates(0.78) — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 306 - A person can be defined by the structure of their relations to the dead
#complicates(0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1262 - The nothingness separating self and Other precedes and founds all relation
#qualifies(0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 675