An end must be both accessible and separated from us by real existents

Evidence

We are free when the final term by which we make known to ourselves what we are is an end; that is, not a real existent like that which in the supposition which we have made could fulfill our wish, but an object which does not yet exist. But consequently this end can be transcendent only if it is separated from us at the same time that it is accessible. Only an ensemble of real existents can separate us from this end—in the same way that this end can be conceived only as a state to-come of the real existents which separate me from it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1153

Categorization

• XREF: This structure of the end as a not-yet-existing transcendent object anticipates Sartre’s later account of the project and of situated freedom in What Is Literature. — connects to: True freedom collapses the separation between means and ends — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 124; The inactive past cannot reach the present except through an ekstatic being; Having a place requires not being wholly absorbed in that place — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1169 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• True freedom collapses the separation between means and ends #contradicts (0.75) — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 124
• Having a place requires not being wholly absorbed in that place #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1169
• The inactive past cannot reach the present except through an ekstatic being #qualifies (0.72)