The being of appearances may differ in kind from appearances of being

Evidence

However for any ontology we should raise a preliminary question: is the phenomenon of being thus achieved identical with the being of phenomena? In other words, is the being which discloses itself to me, which appears to me, of the same nature as the being of existents which appear to me? It seems that there is no difficulty. Husserl has shown how an eidetic reduction is always possible; that is, how one can always pass beyond the concrete phenomenon toward its essence. For Heidegger also “human reality” is ontic-ontological; that is, it can always pass beyond the phemomenon toward its being. But the passage from the particular object to the essence is a passage from homogeneous to homogeneous. Is it the same for the passage from the existent to the phenomenon of being: Is passing beyond the existent toward the phenomenon of being actually to pass beyond it toward its being, as one passes beyond the particular red toward its essence? Let us consider further. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 121

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Distinguishes the phenomenon of being from the being of phenomena — the point of entry into the for-itself/in-itself distinction.
  • XREF: Directly engages Husserl’s eidetic reduction and Heidegger’s ontic-ontological distinction — central to the Continental backdrop this reading pursues. — connects to: Essence is the manifest law of appearances, itself an appearance — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 116; The ontological difference distinguishes specific entities from the Being they have.; Being is necessarily defined against what it is not — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 183 (+6 more)

Broader Connections