The for-itself is necessarily haunted by value and its own possibilities

Evidence

Ontology has revealed to us, in fact, the origin and the nature of value; we have seen that value is the lack in relation to which the for-itself determines its being as a lack. By the very fact that the for-itself exists, as we have seen, value arises to haunt its being-for-itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1445 (#expands, via linked claim)

The possible is the something which the For-itself lacks in order to be itself. Consequently it is not appropriate to say that it is qua possible—unless by being we are to understand the being of an existent which “is made-to-be” in so far as it is made-not-to-be, or if you prefer, the appearance at a distance of what I am. The possible does not exist as a pure representation, not even as a denied one, but as a real lack of being which, qua lack, is beyond being. It has the being of a lack and as lack, it lacks being. The Possible is not, the possible is possibilized to the exact degree that the For-itself makes itself be; the possible determines in schematic outline a location in the nothingness which the For-itself is beyond itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 387 (#expands, via linked claim)

The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is present to consciousness as not being consciousness. The original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. But as negation comes to the world by means of the for-itself, and as the thing is what it is in the absolute indifference of identity, it can not be the thing which is posited as not being the for-itself. Negation comes from the for-itself. We should not conceive this negation as a type of judgment which would bear on the thing itself and deny concerning it that it is the for-itself; this type of negation could be conceived only if the for-itself were a substance already fully formed, and even in that case it could emanate only as a third being establishing from outside a negative relation between two beings. But by the original negation the for-itself constitutes itself as not being the thing. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Value arises from the for-itself’s constitutive lack — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1445; The possible is a real lack the For-itself projects beyond itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 387; The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 571 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Value arises from the for-itself’s constitutive lack #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1445
• The possible is a real lack the For-itself projects beyond itself. #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 387
• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571
• The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1432
• The For-itself can only found itself by projecting toward a future it never reaches #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 453
• The for-itself is only the emptiness where the in-itself detaches #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 576
• Subjectivity cannot reside in its own being but haunts itself #exemplifies (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 374