Consciousness never coincides with itself because it exists for a witness

Evidence

The distinguishing characteristic of consciousness, on the other hand, is that it is a decompression of being. Indeed it is impossible to define it as coincidence with itself. Of this table I can say only that it is purely and simply this table. But I can not limit myself to saying that my belief is belief; my belief is the consciousness (of) belief. It is often said that the act of reflection alters the fact of consciousness on which it is directed. Husserl himself admits that the fact “of being seen” involves a total modification for each Erlebnis. But I believe that I have demonstrated that the first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito. This cogito, to be sure, does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness. But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective cogito since it appears as the first necessity for non-reflective consciousness to be seen by itself. Originally then the cogito includes this nullifying characteristic of existing for a witness, although the witness for which consciousness exists is itself. Thus by the sole fact that my belief is apprehended as belief, it is no longer only belief; that is, it is already no longer belief, it is troubled belief. Thus the ontological judgment “belief is consciousness (of) belief” can under no circumstances be taken as a statement of identity; the subject and the attribute are radically different though still within the indissoluble unity of one and the same being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 329

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the for-itself as a ‘decompression of being’ and explains the pre-reflective cogito as homologous to reflection.
• XREF: Directly anticipates Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity — the permanent split within the subject is the ground of ambiguity. — connects to: Consciousness’s temporality refuses the instant because the for-itself never is. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 501; Consciousness is necessarily directed at a being other than itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 151; Reflection aims to make the self-coincident being that consciousness can never simply be — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 511 (+5 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The passage that the reflecting-on-a-belief renders it ‘troubled belief’ is a dense, paradigm-shifting account of why self-presence always introduces distance — the root of bad faith.

Broader Connections

• Consciousness’s temporality refuses the instant because the for-itself never is. #corroborates (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 501
• Reflection aims to make the self-coincident being that consciousness can never simply be #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 511
• Consciousness is necessarily directed at a being other than itself #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 151
• Consciousness has no inertia; it must perpetually recreate its own states #expands (0.70) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 301