The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself

Evidence

But the other negation is the reason for the appearance of the new one; for if there is an Other who puts me out of play by positing my transcendence as purely contemplated, this is because I wrench myself away from the Other by assuming my limit. The consciousness (of) this wrenching away of the consciousness of (being) the same in relation to the Other is the consciousness (of) my free spontaneity. By this very wrenching away which puts the Other in possession of my limit, I am already putting the Other out of play. Therefore in so far as I am conscious (of) myself as of one of my free possibilities and in so far as I project myself toward myself in order to realize this selfness, to that extent I am responsible for the existence of the Other. It is I who by the very affirmation of my free spontaneity cause there to be an Other and not simply an infinite reference of consciousness to itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 781 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Thus what for lack of a better term we called the cogito of the Other’s existence is merged with my own cogito. The cogito examined once again, must throw me outside it and onto the Other, just as it threw me outside upon the In-itself; and this must be done not by revealing to me an a priori structure of myself which would point toward an equally a priori Other but by disclosing to me the concrete, indubitable presence of a particular, concrete Other, just as it has already revealed to me my own incomparable, contingent but necessary, and concrete existence. Thus we must ask the For-itself to deliver to us the For-others; we must ask absolute immanence to throw us into absolute transcendence. In my own inmost depths I must find not reasons for believing that the Other exists but the Other himself as not being me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 710 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Beauvoir, however, argues later in Th e Ethics of Ambiguity, “I concern others and they concern me. Th ere we have an irreducible truth. Th e me-others relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship” (EA, 72; MA, 104). So understood, Beauvoir comes to see Others as essential and not merely factually necessary. Contrary to Sartre’s ontological individualism, Beauvoir argues for an intrinsic ontological interdependence. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity.; The Other’s worldly presence is not analytically derivable from its transcendent subjectivity.; The for-itself’s free spontaneity makes the Other’s existence possible — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 781 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• The for-itself’s free spontaneity makes the Other’s existence possible #complicates (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 781
• Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference #contradicts (0.72) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 710
• Beauvoir holds Others as essential, challenging Sartre’s ontological individualism #contradicts (0.72) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184