Desire is defined by its transcendent object, not by pursuit of pleasure

Evidence

We must abandon straight off the idea that desire is the desire of pleasure or the desire for the cessation of a pain. For we can not see how the subject could get out of this state of immanence so as to “attach” his desire to an object. Every subjectivist and immanentist theory will fail to explain how we desire a particular woman and not simply our sexual satisfaction. It is best therefore to define desire by its transcendent object. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 972

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines desire by its transcendent object against subjectivist/immanentist failures.
• XREF: Directly sets up Beauvoir’s treatment of desire in The Second Sex; also connects to Scheler/Husserl affective intentionality referenced at the end. — connects to: Desire must be its own lack, not a merely physiological state — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 355; Desire aims at eternalizing itself rather than annihilating itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 385; Desire is consciousness directed outward at objects, not a psychic entity contained within — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1316 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Desire is consciousness directed outward at objects, not a psychic entity contained within #corroborates (0.92) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1316
• Desire is doomed to failure because coitus and pleasure are not its essential goal #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 987
• Coitus is a contingent modality rather than the essential goal of desire #expands (0.90)
• Pleasure follows from desire rather than desire being caused by pleasure #corroborates (0.85) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2231