We-subject feeling is a solipsistic illusion with no real social being

Evidence

Yet we can see that this can be only if by the earlier acceptance of a common end and of common instruments I constitute myself as an undifferentiated transcendence by rejecting my personal ends beyond the collective ends at present pursued. Thus whereas in the experience of being-for-others the upsurge of a dimension of real and concrete being is the condition for the very experience, the experience of the We-subject is a pure psychological, subjective event in a single consciousness; it corresponds to an inner modification of the structure of this consciousness but does not appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological relation with others and does not realize any Mitsein. It is a question only of a way of feeling myself in the midst of others. Of course this experience can be looked on as the symbol of an absolute, metaphysical unity of all transcendences; it seems, in fact, that it overcomes the original conflict of transcendences by making them converge in the direction of the world. In this sense the ideal We-subject would be the “we” of a humanity which would make itself master of the earth. But the experience of the “we” remains on the ground of individual psychology and remains a simple symbol of .the longed-for unity of transcendences. It is, in fact, in no way a lateral, real apprehension of subjectivities as such by a single subjectivity; the subjectivities remain out of reach and radically separated. But it is things and bodies, it is the material channeling of my transcendence which disposes me to apprehend it as extended and supported by the other transcendences without my getting out of my self and without the others getting out of themselves. I apprehend through the world that I form a part of “we.” — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1035 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

These few remarks do not claim to exhaust the question of the “We.” They aim only at indicating that the experience of the We-subject has no value as a metaphysical revelation; it depends strictly on the various forms of the for-others and is only an empirical enrichment of certain of these forms. It is to this fact evidently that we should attribute the extreme instability of this experience. It comes and disappears capriciously, leaving us in the face of others-as-objects or else of a “They” who look at us. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1041 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

This does not mean, of course, that each member of a society is conscious of such an abstract notion of unity. It means that he is absorbed in innumerable, specific relations and in the feeling and the knowledge of determining others and of being determined by them. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 169 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Social unity is felt through concrete relations rather than abstract awareness — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 169; Humans are constituted by their social relations rather than an intrinsic essence — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 2517; The We-subject experience is a subjective psychological event, not an ontological relation — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1035 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• The We-subject experience is a subjective psychological event, not an ontological relation #corroborates (0.95) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1035
• Social unity is felt through concrete relations rather than abstract awareness #complicates (0.85) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 169
• The We-subject experience is unstable and carries no metaphysical weight #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1041
• The subject’s unity is an effect of social configuration, not a premise #corroborates (0.78) — Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic…, 333
• Humans are constituted by their social relations rather than an intrinsic essence #qualifies (0.72) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 2517