Solipsism cannot be refuted by assurance arguments alone

Evidence

Thus what for lack of a better term we called the cogito of the Other’s existence is merged with my own cogito. The cogito examined once again, must throw me outside it and onto the Other, just as it threw me outside upon the In-itself; and this must be done not by revealing to me an a priori structure of myself which would point toward an equally a priori Other but by disclosing to me the concrete, indubitable presence of a particular, concrete Other, just as it has already revealed to me my own incomparable, contingent but necessary, and concrete existence. Thus we must ask the For-itself to deliver to us the For-others; we must ask absolute immanence to throw us into absolute transcendence. In my own inmost depths I must find not reasons for believing that the Other exists but the Other himself as not being me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 710 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 710; Epistemic assurance rests on doubt, not certainty — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 272

Broader Connections

• Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference #complicates (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 710