Idealism reduces the object to non-being, a lack defined by absence

Evidence

If then we wish at any price to make the being of the phenomenon depend on consciousness, the object must be distinguished from consciousness not by its presence but by its absence, not by its plenitude, but by its nothingness. If being belongs to consciousness, the object is not consciousness, not to the extent that it is another being, but that it is non-being. This is the appeal to the infinite of which we spoke in the first section of this work. For Husserl, for example, the animation of the hyletic nucleus by the only intentions which can find their fulfilment (Erfüllung) in this hyle is not enough to bring us outside of subjectivity. The truly objectifying intentions are empty intentions, those which aim beyond the present subjective appearance at the infinite totality of the series of appearances. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 148

Categorization

• XREF: The empty intentionality and infinite series of appearances recall how we as readers have the fate of David Bell in mind. — connects to: For idealism the object’s objective being is constituted by absence, not plenitude — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 149; Husserl’s noema doctrine reduces being to appearing, a form of Berkeleyan idealism.
• DEFINE: Introduces the technical contrast between filled and empty intentions in Husserl.

Broader Connections

• For idealism the object’s objective being is constituted by absence, not plenitude #corroborates (0.95) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 149