Knowing is the very being of the for-itself, not a relation
Evidence
Knowledge appears then as a mode of being. Knowing is neither a relation established after the event between two beings, nor is it an activity of one of these two beings, nor is it a quality of a property or a virtue. It is the very being of the for-itself in so far as this is presence to——; that is, in so far as the for-itself has to be its being by making itself not to be a certain being to which it is present. This means that the for-itself can be only in the mode of a reflection (reflet) causing itself to be reflected as not being a certain being. The “something” which must qualify the reflected in order that the dyad “the-reflection-reflecting” may not dissolve in nothingness is pure negation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 572
Categorization
- DEFINE: Identifies knowledge with the for-itself’s negating mode of being rather than a property or activity — essential to the ontological core.
- XREF: Grounds the systematic backdrop to Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity. — connects to: Knowing is realizing being through an inner negating transcendence; Knowing aims to coincide with being yet is structured as not being it; Knowledge is not a property but is the ekstatic being of the For-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 651 (+5 more)
Broader Connections
- Knowing aims to coincide with being yet is structured as not being it
#expands(0.95) - Knowledge is not a property but is the ekstatic being of the For-itself
#corroborates(0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 651 - Knowledge of being presupposes the knower’s separation from the being known
#expands(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 653