Lack presupposes a totality that the existing and the lacking jointly compose

Evidence

Ontology has revealed to us, in fact, the origin and the nature of value; we have seen that value is the lack in relation to which the for-itself determines its being as a lack. By the very fact that the for-itself exists, as we have seen, value arises to haunt its being-for-itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1445 (#expands, via linked claim)

Value is affected with the double character, which moralists have very inadequately explained, of both being unconditionally and not being. Qua value indeed, value has being, but this normative existent does not have to be precisely as reality. Its being is to be value; that is, not-to-be being. Thus the being of value qua value is the being of what does not have being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 367 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Value arises from the for-itself’s constitutive lack — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1445; Value’s being consists precisely in not having being — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 367; The for-others requires a totality in which selfness and the Other are reciprocal structures (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Value arises from the for-itself’s constitutive lack #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1445
• Value’s being consists precisely in not having being #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 367
• The for-others requires a totality in which selfness and the Other are reciprocal structures #corroborates (0.80)
• A perpetual failed synthesis keeps the in-itself and for-itself inseparable yet independent #expands (0.75)
• Specific lacks are perceived as definite negative presences #exemplifies (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 499