I negate the Other who is himself negating me

Evidence

At the origin of the problem of the existence of others, there is a fundamental presupposition: others are the Other, that is the self which is not myself. Therefore we grasp here a negation as the constitutive structure of the being-of-others. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 675 (#expands, via linked claim)

These observations are applicable without any essential change to the primary relation of the For-itself with the Other. If in general there is an Other, it is necessary above all that I be the one who is not the Other; and it is in this very negation effected by me upon myself that I make myself be and that the Other arises as the Other. This negation which constitutes my being and which, as Hegel said, makes me appear as the Same confronting the Other, constitutes me on the ground of a non-thetic selfness as “Myself.” We need not understand by this that a Self comes to dwell in our consciousness but that selfness is reinforced by arising as a negation of another selfness and that this reinforcement is positively apprehended as the continuous choice of selfness by itself as the same selfness and as this very selfness. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 775 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The Other resists concept-status because he radically negates rather than extends my experience. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 670; The Other is constituted by negation as the self which is not myself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 675; The Other’s mutual negation is required for being-for-others, not merely my own (+3 more)

Broader Connections