Charles Tilly — Regimes and Repertoires

422 published claims from this book.

• A concession to one actor legitimizes that claim type for all others.
• A government is defined as the coercion-wielding organization holding priority over all others
• A high-capacity nondemocratic regime rolled back civil rights in response to an external threat.
• A new counterterrorism agency abandoned established statistics-reporting conventions
• A regime can combine nominal constitutional review with aggressive closure of the political arena
• A regime consists of repeated strong relations among government and major political actors.
• A regime is defined relationally as recurring strong interactions among political actors
• A regime’s past path in capacity-democracy space shapes its contention practices.
• A regime’s prior trajectory shapes its present repertoires
• A revolution combines a divided regime with a shift to new rulers
• A revolutionary situation’s outcome depends on prevailing regimes and repertoires.
• A ruler’s security apparatus can be self-financing through off-budget funds
• A seemingly unshakable autocratic regime collapsed through converging domestic and international pressure
• A semi-revolutionary juncture can yield negotiated compromise rather than overthrow
• A single repertoire performance can act where full social movements have no standing
• A sitting president described his own regime as fragmenting with weak public institutions.
• A small repertoire of performances can weave into widespread rebellion.
• A social movement is defined by three-way interactions, not solo action.
• A state-sponsored rival party collapsed once its government patron switched sides
• A state’s own inclusionary categories become the vehicles of its dissolution
• After Habyarimana’s death a military coup displaced the legal successor and seized state power.
• All contentious action reduces to identity, standing, or program claims
• American contention runs on claim-making governed by constitutional rights and state protection.
• An authority’s name for a gathering does not make that gathering causally coherent
• Analysts read unclaimed attacks as covert state sponsorship
• Anti-globalization protests at Evian drew 100-150 thousand demonstrators
• Apartheid intensified inherited colonial categories rather than inventing them anew.
• Apartheid intensified preexisting state-created categories rather than inventing new ones
• Apartheid’s hostel system created demographically skewed enclaves prone to conflict
• Apolitical township residents began contentious mobilizing only after UDF campaigns of 1983.
• Aristotle explained contention as resulting jointly from social balance and regime type
• Aristotle’s typology hinges each good regime on rule for the common interest
• Armed challengers strike at elections where state capacity is weak
• Authoritarian and democratic regimes differ mainly in emphasis on anticipatory versus responsive repression
• Authority names for behavior do not certify coherent phenomena.
• Authority tolerance of demonstrations lagged decades behind their practice
• Belgium instigated Rwanda’s ethnic massacres by switching favor from Tutsi to Hutu
• Binding consultation requires concrete preference-communicating institutions, not rulers’ claims to embody the will.
• Boundary-based violence protests threats to social arrangements built on those boundaries
• Bribery patterns reveal that media control outweighed official loyalty in sustaining an authoritarian regime
• Bribery rather than repression was the chief tool for controlling media and legislators
• Britain’s Boer War victory interned over 200,000 civilians in camps
• British capitalism’s distinctive trajectory shaped how ordinary people contested collectively
• British warfare built state capacity and de-democratized Britain before 1815.
• Brokerage creates new collective actors and identities by connecting unconnected sites
• Calling an event ‘riot’ or ‘revolution’ is itself a consequential claim
• Capacity loss in nondemocratic regimes raises collective violence, as in the post-1985 USSR.
• Capitalist labor demand contradicts South Africa’s categorical containment strategy.
• Changes in demonstration form reflect deeper shifts in social movement politics
• Civil war and terror are causally heterogeneous across regimes, defying single theories
• Civil war and terror are causally heterogeneous, not unitary phenomena
• Claim-making reciprocally alters the regime that constrains it in the medium run
• Class-based revolutions from below distort the wider record of forcible power shifts
• Classical regime mapping classifies by who rules and whether for common or private interest
• Co-optation reforms can backfire by fueling the resistance they aim to defuse
• Co-optive indirect rule survives only while center support and local insulation both hold
• Coalition formation across rival black movements was essential to apartheid’s overthrow
• Collective violence nearly always activates a we-they boundary from among multiple available identities
• Collective violence shifts with changing opportunity structures, not static conditions
• Colonial ethnography supplied the classificatory categories apartheid segregation built upon.
• Colonial labor regimes depend on oscillating absorption and expulsion of migrant workers.
• Color-coded demonstrations spread transnationally as a new repertoire element
• Color-coded protest identities spread across postsocialist regimes as WUNC displays.
• Combining campaign, repertoire, and WUNC displays asserted popular sovereignty.
• Commitment ties between rulers and ruled substitute for coercion
• Commodity wealth converts revolutionary movements into profiteers or strengthens them depending on discipline
• Communal risings alone never succeeded against states without elite allies
• Complete enumeration of periodical-reported events can substitute for representative sampling
• Conciliation against intact establishments alienated both reformer and conservative camps
• Consolidated states face far fewer revolutionary situations than founding regimes do
• Contemporary revolutions increasingly empower warlord governments rather than consent-based regimes
• Contention forms are regime-bound but also historically embedded
• Contention is not a hydraulic response to pressure but shaped by prior institutions
• Contention is political only when claims are public and governmental
• Contention spirals make rulers’ performances rigid and challengers’ flexible
• Contention-driven regime transformation remains an unanswered puzzle
• Contention’s regularities need historical, not just mechanistic, explanation.
• Contentious claims sort into identity, standing, and program, usually building in that order.
• Contentious events in any setting fall into a limited number of repeating categories
• Contentious gathering counts omit smaller and scattered actions plus their preparation and aftermath
• Contentious gatherings are defined as public, collective claim-making events involving ten or more people
• Contentious gatherings as defined are not restricted to disorderly events
• Contentious innovation is incremental and endures mainly when it yields real advantage.
• Contentious political categories like riot are symbolically but not causally coherent.
• Contentious politics analysis must steer between abstraction and particularity
• Contentious politics is collective claim-making for power and advantage
• Contentious politics is defined by government involvement in claims among groups
• Contentious repertoires vary systematically with location in regime space, datable from either direction.
• Contentious violence against minorities can yield major electoral gains for the aggressors’ party.
• Coordinated violence ranges from improvised to centrally scripted
• Countersummits institutionalized into an imitable social forum model
• Dahl’s contestation concerns institutionalized opposition rights, not actual contention patterns.
• Declining capacity widens tolerated contention by forcing repressive triage.
• Declining state capacity expands tolerated contention through repressive neglect
• Declining state reward capacity triggered elite runoff akin to a bank run
• Democracies install baseline rights even where capacity is low and violence high
• Democracies prescribe few performances but tolerate many while high-capacity autocracies do the reverse
• Democracy channels contention into bargaining over claim-making boundaries
• Democracy enables bargaining over contention boundaries that autocrats suppress
• Democracy plus high capacity generated the social-movement repertoire bundling old performances.
• Democracy’s classic perversion is the poor governing against the rich
• Democratic high-capacity regimes exhibit distinctive patterned contention.
• Democratic high-capacity regimes vary remarkably in domestic contention despite controlling violence
• Democratic institutions channel contention into electoral forms while autocracies push it underground
• Democratic institutions may constrain raw state coercion against opposition
• Democratic regimes are rare, contingent, recent historical creations.
• Democratic regimes channel contentious claims into prescribed institutional forms.
• Democratic regimes deploy civilian police rather than military against protesters
• Democratization always results from and generates extensive contention
• Democratization without capacity loss first raises then lowers collective violence.
• Democratizing Peru held its own death-squad veterans accountable
• Demonstration frequency tracks and helps drive expansion of civil liberties
• Demonstration location shifts with state control over public space
• Demonstrations and national general strikes replaced turnouts in Belgian contention.
• Demonstrations detached from social movements and diffused into nondemocratic regimes
• Demonstrations evolved into highly flexible claim-making by massing supporters at power sites
• Demonstrations synthesize local specificity with widely legible contentious forms
• Destructiveness rises with both damage salience and coordination
• Direct rule enables democracy but has mostly sustained authoritarian regimes
• Disappeared violent street politics is explained by severed links and co-optation, not institutionalization
• Drug-based gang violence can threaten an established democracy’s future
• Drug-transit wealth funds armed gangs capable of eroding democracy
• Each historical era has distinctive dominant forms of popular contention.
• Early British struggles won exceptional rights that later struggles re-purposed toward class and citizenship
• Early independence victories in some republics encouraged broader bids that turned violent
• Early state consolidation produced early contentious peaks that subsided under high-capacity rule
• Eastern European color revolutions arose from stolen elections and foreign support.
• Economic changes affect contention only as filtered through regime change
• Effective claim-making innovates at the edges of familiar performance scripts
• Effective forbidding of violence plus toleration of nonviolent performance reduces violence salience
• Eighteenth-century British contention was parochial, particular, and bifurcated
• Election fraud by a post-Soviet president triggered the Georgian Rose Revolution.
• Electoral campaigns, social-movement performances, and WUNC displays fuse in nationalist politics across regimes
• Electoral defeat of hardliners triggers concessions to challengers
• Electoral democracy can persist amid rampant police and gang violence
• End of external patronage turned Somali collaborators into combatants in an attrition war
• Entrepreneurship, polarization, and rising uncertainty drive violence escalation across a boundary
• Escalating resistance met with legalized repression entrenches rather than contains mobilization.
• Ethnic and religious fragmentation do not predict civil war onset
• Ethnic and religious fragmentation weakly predict civil war; feasibility of insurgency does
• European regions hosted revolutionary situations nearly a quarter of the time after 1492
• Even the United States falls short of full democratic protection
• Every act of contention joins program, identity, and standing claims.
• Everyday violence categories obscure causal relations and transformations between types
• Exclusionary and repressive weak states bred revolution while tolerant ones did not.
• Exclusive territorial national jurisdictions are a recent twentieth-century invention
• Exhaustive enumeration reveals contention falls into a limited set of recurring forms
• Existing political institutions, not just pressure levels, shape contention.
• Explanations of revolution must name processes, not prior conditions, and vary by regime.
• Extant theory ignores how contention itself transforms regimes.
• External great-power pressure pushed South Africa toward negotiated compromise
• Favorable political opportunity structure shifts facilitated black mobilization against apartheid
• Formal democracy did not extend to rural Peru, fueling civil war
• Forms of popular struggle vary dramatically across place and time.
• Freedom House ratings measure democracy but never governmental capacity directly
• Freedom House’s combined ratings proxy democracy with weak capacity content
• Full-scale low-capacity democratic regimes are historically rare and short-lived.
• General speech and assembly rights both enable and are shaped by demonstrations
• Global terrorism actually declined steadily from its 1987-88 peak until 2004
• Globalized protest follows the same two-century-old demonstration routines
• Governmental capacity causally shapes the character of contentious politics
• Governmental capacity means top-down control, distinct from infrastructural coordination
• Governments override civil-liberty principles when threats to survival arise.
• Granting labor and land concessions to contain opposition backfired and solidified it
• Great-power recognition signaling fueled violent ethnic mobilization in post-Communist Eurasia
• Gujarat’s 2002 anti-Muslim violence was state-orchestrated and electorally rewarded
• Habit cannot explain contention’s pattern of unceasing small-scale innovation
• Habyarimana feared multiple domestic and foreign enemies while engaging in peace negotiations.
• Habyarimana’s 1973 coup established a two-decade one-party Rwandan regime
• High capacity alone never makes a regime democratic; citizenship breadth, consultation, and protection matter.
• High capacity and democracy suppress revolutionary situations while medium-capacity regimes favor outcomes
• High regime capacity and democracy suppress revolutionary situations by raising organizing costs.
• High-capacity authoritarian regimes can nonetheless be overturned by sustained contention.
• High-capacity authoritarian regimes confine claim-making to state limits or surveilled niches
• High-capacity authoritarian regimes defeat uncoordinated protest with diffuse aims.
• High-capacity flawed democracies absorb electoral change without major violence
• High-capacity governments hold near-monopolies of terror but use it sparingly
• High-capacity low-democracy regimes use rights rhetoric while suppressing organized Islamist opposition
• High-capacity mobilization hits the regime directly while low-capacity contention rarely does
• High-capacity regimes are likelier to involve state violent specialists in whatever collective violence occurs
• High-capacity regimes route contention through government, making mobilization affect regime structure.
• High-capacity regimes’ monopoly on coercion means their own agents dominate the violence that occurs
• High-capacity semi-democratic regimes generated the social-movement repertoire that channeled revolutionary contention
• High-capacity states’ homogenization efforts paradoxically breed rival nationalist claims to self-determination
• High-coordination violence kills more per episode, but frequent low-coordination violence cumulates to similar damage
• Higher regime capacity with some democratic freedoms produces intermediate contention
• Human rights associations prompt high-capacity monarchies to grant controlled political amnesties.
• Hundreds of thousands of Rwandan civilians joined the massacres.
• Identity recognition precedes standing claims which precede program claims
• Identity, standing, and program claims move independently and can decouple
• In a U.S.-China war, domestic fragmentation would sap American will to fight
• In Belgium, street protest and parliamentary politics grew mutually dependent after 1848
• In mature democracies contention turns nonviolent unless state agents block it
• Increasingly transnational movements have surprisingly left the basic repertoire unchanged
• India combines high governmental capacity with genuinely democratic contested elections
• India domesticates the standard social-movement repertoire into parliament-oriented claim-making
• Indiscriminate repression by weak militarized states breeds revolutionary movements.
• Initial conditions shape but do not determine contention outcomes across regimes
• Initial conditions shape but do not determine contentious processes
• Innovation in claim-making is bounded by established repertoire limits
• Institutional absorption of one subordinated group spurs mobilization among those excluded
• Institutional co-optation channels trusted regional leaders
• Institutions designed to divide subordinates instead create new arenas for struggle.
• Intermittent violent actors must be read against the full political context of their regime
• International revolutionary models and support make revolutionary situations more frequent
• Interstate war is defined by declared belligerency, not violent form.
• Jamaican police kill more than 140 citizens per year
• Late-arriving or persistent nationalist movements faced rising state resistance and violence.
• Laws of contention vary by regime type and era.
• Legal toleration of demonstrations took half a century of struggle along three fronts
• Legalizing demonstrations made claim-making less violent but more frequent
• Legalizing the right to strike channels workers away from earlier tactics
• Local township militancy arose indigenously before the ANC organized it
• Local warlords under apartheid played classic indirect-rule politics
• Low state capacity correlates with insurgent mass abduction and civilian militia formation
• Low- and high-coordination violence complement each other within sustained campaigns
• Low-capacity democracies are rare and historically short-lived
• Low-capacity nondemocratic regimes tolerate wide contentious claim-making.
• Low-capacity, nondemocratic regimes rely on military force against armed challengers
• Low-coordination scattered violence can cause more damage than organized violence
• Many phenomena are symbolically unified but lack causal coherence
• Mass national citizenship was bargained out in Britain after 1750.
• Media overrepresent violence, hiding that most claim-making is nonviolent.
• Methodological changes and the Iraq war jointly explain the jump in reported terrorist incidents
• Militants frame mosque destruction as purifying humiliation and unifying their nation.
• Military format constrains which class can dominate a regime
• Military seizure of power signals low regime capacity
• Moore explained regime change through agricultural class relations and contention
• Morocco exemplifies a high-capacity nondemocratic regime with a long state history.
• Morocco’s liberalization coexisted with continuing state licensing of civil society
• Most contention strongly reuses familiar performance forms rather than innovating
• Most Peruvian political-violence victims were neglected highland Indian peasants
• Most public politics involves routine transactions without open contention
• Most regimes in history have been low-capacity and nondemocratic.
• Naming and categorizing contention shapes how authorities and publics respond
• National domestic struggles absorb activist energy that might target global summits
• National-scale claims replaced local ones as Belgian workers adopted general strikes.
• Nationalist leaders deliberately restage sacred-history narratives as political pilgrimage
• News coverage massively overrepresents violent over nonviolent claim-making.
• Nineteenth-century claim-making became cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous
• No coherent theory links regime type to forms of contention
• No state grants an explicit legal right to demonstrate as such
• No systematic mapping links contentious politics forms to regime types.
• Nonrevolutionary claim-making forms later become available as revolutionary instruments when repertoires diffuse
• Official Colored category absorbed anyone failing crisp racial classification
• Older and younger activists supplied complementary governance styles during the township rising
• Only their joint combination distinguishes social movements from other politics
• Organized workers replaced petition delegations with autonomous demonstrations.
• Path dependence plus recurrent mechanisms jointly explain contention’s regularities.
• Peru’s president downplayed army massacres of peasants in 1988
• Peruvian mobs lynched officials accused of corruption as routine extra-legal control.
• Polemical strategy’s opening move determines whether an audience will listen
• Political actors divide into members, challengers, and outside interveners
• Political actors form through regimes rather than preceding them.
• Political contention engages state coercive power and affects regime future
• Political contention requires public, collective claims implicating a government.
• Political opportunity structure has five static components and consists dynamically of change in them
• Political parties can be underwritten by warlords running local protection rackets
• Political resources comprise coercion, capital, and commitment
• Political resources reduce to coercion, capital, and commitment.
• Political rights and civil liberties scores correlate strongly across regimes
• Political-opportunity structures constrain ordinary people’s collective claim-making
• Postcolonial trajectories, not regime quadrant, explain differing contention inscriptions
• Postwar civil wars cluster in high-capacity regimes with ungoverned zones and in low-capacity nondemocracies.
• Postwar genuine revolutions occurred on three continents beyond Europe.
• Postwar revolutionary success depended heavily on regimes’ international connections.
• Postwar revolutions genuinely occurred across Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
• Postwar social revolutions transformed state and class structures from below outside Europe
• Pre-existing categorical models shape how both actors and analysts identify complex events
• Pre-nineteenth-century empires ruled indirectly through autonomous regional power-holders.
• Proximity to democratic regimes spreads social-movement forms into nondemocratic settings
• Public politics is broader than contentious politics, which always involves a government.
• Rapid opportunity shifts ignite spirals of contention reaching revolutionary extremes
• Rapid political change and tradition clashes weaken routine-embedded repertoires into innovation
• Rare violence in high-capacity democracies is politically magnified precisely because it is rare
• Regime actors divide into members, challengers, and outsiders by access.
• Regime and repertoire correspond without being tautological
• Regime and repertoire organization shapes which revolutionary shifts occur.
• Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape prevailing contentious repertoires.
• Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape the violence level of domestic contention
• Regime capacity shapes how contention is channeled between prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden performances
• Regime capacity, not just state consolidation, shapes revolutionary coalition frequency and type.
• Regime change and contention mutually shape each other over long periods
• Regime change and contentious politics mutually shape one another
• Regime change drives repertoire change more than popular consciousness does
• Regime form shapes which collective actors can act on their interests
• Regime narrowing of tolerated nonviolent performances channels claimants toward violence and invites state force
• Regime quadrants describe agent-citizen relations, not just citizen repertoires
• Regime shifts can selectively open opportunity to specific activist constituencies while excluding others.
• Regime structure determines revolutionary situation frequency and character
• Regime surveys center on discontinuous public collective claim-making between distinct political actors
• Regime trajectory changes produce shifts in challengers’ political opportunity structure
• Regime type determines the forms and intensity of collective violence
• Regime type shapes who confronts protesters and how claims get made
• Regime typology work splits between principled and historical approaches
• Regime-analysis must specify how institutionalized rights interact with rightful and defiant contention
• Regime-internal relational shifts drive contention against both bottom-up and top-down causality
• Regime-internal shifts, not challenger agency or external pressure, initiate repertoire change
• Regime-specific histories shape the repertoires available to social movements.
• Regimes shape claim-making repertoires through control, constitution of claimants, and issue streams
• Regimes shape political opportunity structure through toleration and forbidding choices
• Regimes sort contention into prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden performances
• Regimes vary along inclusiveness and contestation as separate dimensions
• Regimes with capital substitute purchase for direct coercion of subjects
• Repertoire change happens through continuous modulation, not sharp breaks.
• Repertoire change intertwines regime transformation, internal struggle history, and broader social change
• Repertoire clustering stems from daily organization, contention history, and regime operations
• Repertoire strength depends on the balance between familiar preference and innovation capacity
• Repertoire type shapes how revolutionary processes unfold even though neither type is inherently revolutionary
• Repertoires are learned, clustered, and improvisational but finite
• Repertoires are toolkits whose efficacy depends on match with tasks and users
• Repertoires of contention are defined by a flexibility continuum from nonexistent to rigid
• Repertoires vary with class relations, issue type, and gathering occasion across settings
• Reported terrorist attacks fell below 1980s levels by the early 2000s
• Repression fails to suppress mobilization and can even accelerate it
• Repression threatening challenger survival produces resistance, not demobilization.
• Revolution definitions should decompose into components present by definition
• Revolutionary coalitions vary along territorial-interest and direct-indirect connection axes
• Revolutionary mobilization arises when state demands exceed citizens’ willingness to comply
• Revolutionary mobilization in early modern Europe meant breaking vertical elite-client ties by definition
• Revolutionary outcomes can occur without revolutionary situations via five pathways
• Revolutionary situation frequency declined across Europe despite escalating warfare scale
• Revolutionary situations and civil wars overlap but measure distinct phenomena
• Revolutionary situations are best explained by regime processes, not universal prior conditions
• Revolutionary situations concentrate in low-capacity regimes while revolutionary outcomes remain rare everywhere
• Revolutionary situations recur often but rarely become outcomes
• Revolutionary situations shift to weaker late-consolidating states after 1800
• Revolutions are defined by rapid drastic shifts in capacity or democracy
• Rights agencies’ reports provide partial evidence for regime-repertoire typologies
• Rights of assembly were won through struggle but then contained by new police forces.
• Rights of association, assembly, and speech determine where social-movement mobilization concentrates
• Rising governmental capacity raises revolution’s stakes and impact while reducing fragmentation
• Rising regime capacity loss triggered a collective theft spiral
• Rising state capacity raises revolution’s stakes and social impact while lowering its odds.
• Rising uncertainty across identity boundaries amplifies and sharpens collective violence
• Rulers with limited coercive means resort to exemplary punishment of a few
• Rwandan radio broadcasts incited genocide by dehumanizing Tutsis
• Scholarly analysis can feed causally coherent terms back into participants’ vocabularies
• Security-force killings of activists triggered escalatory cycles of mourning and reprisal
• Segmented early states made revolutions break vertical ties rather than horizontal ones
• Semi-democratic medium-capacity regimes occupy an intermediate contention position
• Severe repression can accelerate the very mobilization it targets.
• Shared meanings can generate real empirical regularities among contenders
• Shared symbolic meanings within movements generate empirical regularities needing causal explanation
• Shift from welfare paternalism to racial modernism produced a new militant generation
• Shifting opportunities drive power-holders rigid and challengers flexible
• Similar capacity-democracy positions still yield sharply divergent national repertoires
• Small-arms proliferation and mercenaries enlarged African civil war feasibility after 1990
• Small, sustained domestic challengers existed constantly across early modern European regions
• Social movements show symbolic but not causal coherence distinct from general contention
• Social movements’ organizational bases shift far more than their repertoires
• Social-movement activity depends on regime-backed rights to endure retaliation
• Social-movement organizations change faster than their performance repertoires
• South Africa’s 1990 mobilization integrated existing small-scale activists rather than recruiting anew
• South African democratization coincided with lethal African-on-African violence
• South African racial categories shifted with expediency despite extreme racism
• Soviet rule functioned by combining elite patronage with blocking rivals’ popular appeals
• Soviet-era contention supplied replicable models for later post-Soviet claim-making.
• Specialized legal regimes for organized labor do not extend rights to other groups
• Stable regimes sustain strong flexible repertoires shaped jointly by culture and structure
• State and police complicity marked the 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim pogrom
• State anticipatory policing and activist innovation jointly forged the social movement
• State commissions manufactured ethnic categories and attached graded citizenship rights to them
• State control confers unmatched coercive and informational advantages worth contention over
• State growth shifted revolutionary coalitions from direct to indirect organizational forms
• State homogenization programs bred contradictory nationalist claims that spur secession
• State labeling of performances enables force and creates models for future action.
• State racism operates pragmatically rather than from coherent durable ideology.
• State recognition channels subordinate-group organization into state-defined categories
• State repression of dissent solidifies community solidarity and legitimates even lethal internal enforcement
• State-imposed categories become available identity bases for subsequent political entrepreneurs.
• States build durable categories that tie unequal rights to separated groups.
• States in all regime types override civil liberties when they face perceived survival threats.
• Successful contention forms a precedent others copy until repression intervenes
• Successful resistance institutionalizes into civic organizations and marginalizes street activism
• Successive Indian regimes escalated Ayodhya from local dispute into national confrontation
• Sustained campaigns, public performances, and WUNC displays jointly define the social movement as distinct
• Sustained challenge plus WUNC displays defines the social movement form
• Terror is a strategy of asymmetric violence deployable by weak or strong actors
• Terror is best studied as one repertoire within regimes, not sui generis
• Terrorist incident counts tripled in one year due to counting changes
• Terrorist violence within a single conflict can vary in coordination level
• Testing Tilly’s repertoire generalizations requires parallel catalogs of state actions and claim-making
• The 1990 Peruvian runoff pitted an elite against a mass candidate.
• The apartheid state engineered categories for groups that had no prior bounded identity.
• The demonstration form is spreading to authoritarian regimes while core repertoire stays static
• The eighteenth-century repertoire permitted constant innovation within set parochial forms of action.
• The French Revolution supplied usable models but not general laws of revolution
• The new claim-making repertoire was less revolutionary than the old one
• The political demonstration and the military show date from the same early-modern moment
• The political meaning of terror originally applied to governments, not only nonstate actors
• The regime space supports both static placement and dynamic trajectory plotting.
• The social movement is a synthesis of campaign, performance repertoire, and WUNC displays
• The Soviet Union’s collapse weakened both sides of South Africa’s standoff and forced negotiation
• The State Department’s terrorism data pipeline was reorganized right before the Iraq invasion
• The transnational movement’s performance repertoire has stayed remarkably stable
• The Uganda example shows a low-capacity nondemocratic regime crushing challengers by military force.
• The United States moved toward higher capacity and lower democracy between 1989 and 2005
• The US denies constitutional protections to non-citizens outside its territory
• This book reworks and updates previously published analyses.
• Tilly leaves regime change, capacity shifts, and democratization causally unexplained
• Tilly’s analysis deliberately privileges regime form over demographic and economic change
• Tilly’s central question links contention to regime type and change
• Tilly’s regime-contention model generalizes across states via adjusted mapping.
• Tilly’s regime-repertoire model remains untested across multiple regimes
• Token political incorporation can accelerate rather than appease opposition mobilization.
• Total-damage measures of violence cannot explain regime-violence interactions
• Township street courts executed alleged traitors by burning tires around their necks
• Transnational anti-globalization and antiwar contention shared the two-century-old social movement form
• Transnational antiglobalization activism extends a two-century-old social-movement form
• Transnational protest camps fragment by ideological affinity into separate villages
• Tribal classification served rulers by manufacturing compliant chiefly authorities.
• Twentieth-century Balkan revolutionary situations were overwhelmingly national in character
• UN-era state-boundary stability crushed secession bids but aided internal revolutions.
• Uneven territorial control shapes the repertoire of contentious politics
• Violence is mapped by damage salience and actor coordination
• Violent contention typically grows out of nonviolent claim-making.
• War-driven state growth displaced contention toward national-scale parliamentary arenas
• War-of-attrition strategic logics only operate within regime-set limits and repertoires
• Weak states whose courts work poorly breed police violence and gang patronage
• Well-brokered cross-organizational coalitions coordinated large-scale resistance
• Whether police carry lethal arms reflects the regime’s democratization path